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The 1977 USSR Constitution:
A Document of Social, National and
International Consolidation
By ANDREW SOROKOWSKI
Member, Class of 1979
The author would like to express his gratitude to Professor WenceslasJ. Wagner of the
University of Detroit for his generosity in providing criticism and suggestions for this
note. Any inaccuracies of interpretation or fact are of course to be attributed to the
author.
ON SATURDAY, June 4, 1977 the front pages ofPravda andlzvestiia
carried the draft of a new constitution of the USSR.' The culmination of
sixteen years of sporadic activity by a commission originally set up by N. S.
Khrushchev, 2 the document aroused mild surprise and considerable
skepticism in the West.3 The Soviet authorities, however, launched a
1. Pravda, June 4, 1977, at 1; Izvestia, June 4, 1977, at 1. See also Ko.wmu.isr, May 1977, at 7.
For English text, see Moscow News, June 11, 1977, at 8, col. 1 (Supp.); London Times, June 6,1977;
CurmrNT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, June 29, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
The May issue of KommutrsTr, the Party journal, reported the submission of the draft by the
Constitutional Commission beaded by General Secretary Leonid L Brezhnev to the May plenum of
the Party Central Committee. Having approved it by a decree of May 24th. the Central Committee
sent it to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. The Presidium approved the draft on May 27th and
submitted it for nationwide discussion. Kow.eeusT, May 1977, at 5-7; see also VEDOMVSTI 'ER-
KHOVNOCO SovETASSSR, June 15,1977, at 375. The new Soviet anthem, submitted simultaneously
with the constitution and likewise approved by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on
May 27, 1977, replaced the war-time anthem praising Stalin, which had itself replaced the "Inter-
nationale." The new anthem begins with a reference to the "unshakeable union of free republics" and
has nationalist overtones. Id. at 375a-375b.
2. See notes 67, 73, 74, and accompanying text, infra. This pace is traditional--imperial codifica-
tion commissions sat for 115 years without significant progress, H. BEIuAPw, JUSTICE IN TnE USSR
205 (rev. ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as BERINIAN].
3. The western press largely confined itself to observing that (1) the Constitution remained
essentially the same, (2) it conflicted with reality, (3) it strengthened Party rule, (4) it narrowed civil
and national rights. Reports in Le Monde and the New York Times, recalling the expulsion of N.
Podgorny, President of the Supreme Soviet, from the Party Politburo at the May Plenum, em-
phasized the new Article 118. This article created a post of First Vice-President and thus would allow
General Secretary Brezhnev to assume formal state leadership while leaving ceremonial functions to
his subordinate. The apparently expanded civil rights provisions, it was observed, were subject to and
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full-scale national discussion, inviting the public to propose amendments to
the draft.4 When on October 7, 1977 a final text was adopted, 5 scores of
articles had been altered.6 The Soviet state could now meet the sixtieth
anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution with the fourth and longest
constitution in" its history.7
The 1977 Constitution contains three fundamental new features. 8
First, the new document clearly proclaims the leading role of the Com-
munist Party in Soviet society. Second, the powers of the Union Repub-
lics are newly and more precisely delineated. Third, the constitution
defines the status and policy of the USSR in world afl'irs. Together, these
therefore nullified by the interests of the State, while new emphasis on the Party role counter-
balanced "democratic" changes in the state structure. The reports devoted considerable attention to
the announced replacement of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" by the "state of the whole people"
in the new stage of "mature socialism and building of communism." The new chapter on foreign
policy, noted the Times Moscow correspondent, partly echoed Helsinki and would soon be tested at
Belgrade, but beyond this he found the changes "largely cosmetic." Le Monde's Moscow correspon-
dent remarked on the constitutional mention of arbitration and 1960's style economic decentraliza
tion. He pointed out that the Union Republics' right to have their own military formations had been
withdrawn (art. 18 (b) ofthe 1936 Constitution), and expressed surprise that they retained the right to
secede (art. 17 of the 1936 Constitution; art. 72 of the 1977 Constitution). Le Monde, June 2.8 at 1,
col. 2; id. at 7, col. 4 (weekly ed.); N.Y. Times, June 4, 1977 at 1, col. 6.
4. Citizens were encouraged to send their proposals to the press. Their letters varied in tone and
content: a reader from Kazakhstan felt that the Constitution should place state interests before civil
rights; a lieutenant stationed in Poland proposed that persecution oferiticism be declared punishable
by law. By summer's end editorial offices had received some 67,000 letters, DEn SPIEGEL, Sept. 5,
1977, at 136, 138. Though ostensibly more democratic, this "public discussion" followed the example
set by Stalin in promulgating the 1936 Constitution. See note 49, infra.
Shortly after the nationwide discussion began, on June 16, 1977, the Sixth Session of the Supreme
Soviet held its 9th meeting and elected L. I. Brezhnev President of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet in Podgorny's place. KomsuNIST, June 1977, at 4. In his acceptance speech on the 17th, Mr.
Brezhnev referred to the "deep political significance" of the Party's May decision to allow combina-
tion of the presidential post with that of Ceneral Secretary of the CPSU. Id. at 7-10.
5. Pravda, Oct. 8, 1977, at 3; Izvestiia, Oct. 8, 1977, at 3. For English translation, see CusutNT
DiEST OF THE SoVEr PRss, Nov. 9, 1977 at 1. The third sentence ofart. 172 of the draft stated that
the constitution would go into effect when adopted, KoNs'nTutrsilA (Constitution) pt. IX, art, 172
(1977 draft, USSR) [hereinafter cited as DRAFr]. In the final text, adopted October 7, 1977, tlt
sentence of what had become art. 173 was deleted, perhaps for superfluity, KONSTIUrrsIIA (Con-
stitution) pt. IX, art. 173 (1977 USSR) [hereinafter cited as KONST.].
6. E.g., The proposal of the officer in the Polish garrison (see note 4, supra) was adopted, KONST,
pt. II, ch. 7, art. 49. Such public participation and discussion is a major point of the new constitution
itself. Sharlet, The New Soviet Constitution, PROBLEMS OF CoMMUNISI, Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 14-18,
24.
The changes discussed hereinafter are to be found in both draft and final text, unless otherwise
noted.
7. Foranaccountofthe6Othanniversarycelebrations, see N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1977, at3, col. 1.
8. For the official Soviet interpretation, see Mr. Brezhnev's May 24, 1977 report before the CPSU
Central Committee plenum. L. I. BREZHNEV, ON THE DRAFr CONSIITUTION OF TIlE UNION Ole
Sovwrr SOcIALIsT REPUBLICS (1977). Three non-Soviet analyses of the draft are Artemov,
Stalinsko-brezhnevskaia konstitutsiia, PosEV, August, 1977, at 4; Prokop, Z pozytsli konsolilatsil
imperil, nastupu i strakhu, SucHAsNIsT', September 1977, at 93; Sharlet, supra note 6, at 4.
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features symbolize a consolidation of social, national and international
achievements. 9
The new features of the 1977 Constitution derive their importance
from their relation to three fundamental characteristics of the Soviet
state. The USSR is dominated by the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, hereinafter CPSU, which makes the principal political decisions
and directs socio-economic policy.' 0 It is also a federal multinational
state, comprising fifteen Union Republics and over a hundred nations and
nationalities." Finally, it is a major world power.
The new features of the constitution have a double significance. On
the one hand, they reflect a conscious development of political ideology
and legal theory. On the other hand, they are a response to contemporary
conditions, to internal and external centrifugal tendencies.' 2 While social
9. This theme recurs in discussions ofthe contemporary USSR. Thus, Prokop speaks ofthe Soviet
leaders desire to "consolidate" their empire, Prokop, supra note 8, at 104; Breslauer refers to the
consolidation" ofMr. Brezhnev's power, Breslauer, The Twenty-fifth Congress: Domestic Issues, in
THE Tw =m'-FIFrH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU 7 (A. Dallin ed. 1977). Mr. Brezhnev himself has
spoken of the "consolidation of the federal principles" in the draft constitution, BREz.iHEV, supra
note 8.
Two types of consolidation are here in issue. On the one hand, there is the actual consolidation of
Soviet power mirrored in the constitution. On the other hand, the embodiment ofpower relations in
the supreme legal document of the state is in itself a consolidation of power.
The present analysis does not deal with the practical effect of the constitution upon Soviet
conditions, but rather with their effect upon the document itself. The latterapproach maywell be the
more fruitful. We shall therefore not enter into a discussion ofthe broad and crucial question ofSoviet
legality. It shiould be noted, however, that a correct assessment of this problem depends upon an
understanding of Soviet legal concepts in their ideological context. Western critics all too often
overlook the special Marxist-Leninist interpretations of familiar terms such as "democracy." See note
119, infra. Given these special interpretations, as well as certain important qualifications, Soviet
practice has to a great extent complied with constitutional norms. In fact the new constitution seems
to surpass its predecessor in obliquely sanctioning official practices of ostensibly questionable
legality. For example, new language in Article 60 mandates "socially useful activity" and condemns
"the evasion of socially useful labor." The latter principle was added in the final text. KoNST. pt. II,
ch. 7, art. 60. Compare 1936 CONST. ch. X, art. 130. Thus an artist, for example, may now be legally
punished for what is deemed to be socially useless work. Freedom ofartistic creation is granted only
"in accordance with the goals of communist construction." KOST. pt. II, ch. 7, art. 47. Citizens
repeatedly fired from their jobs for political reasons may presumably also be punished under the
Constitution for evasion of"socially useful" activity. New language in Article 62 obligates citizens to
"safeguard the interests of the Soviet state" and"help strengthen its might and prestige." Kosr. pt.
II, ch. 7, art. 62. Compare 1936 CONST. ch. 133. Thus, for example, any attempt to implement Article
72, on the right of union-republican secession, would clearly run afoul of Article 62. A questionable
criminal conviction such as that discussed in note 107, infra, would now enjoy incontestable
constitutionality.
10. See Meissner, Party Supremacy: Some Legal Questions, PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, March-
April 1965, at 28-33.
11. See note 199, infra.
12. E.g., Brzezinski speaks of "centrifugar' forces in the East Bloc, 7. BRZEZtNSKI, TIlE SOVIET
BLOC 500, 503 (1967); Prokop refers to the "centrifuga' forces working among the non-Russian
No. 2] U.S.S.R. tONSTIUTION
328 HASTINGS INTL AND COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol, 1
differentiation threatens Party control,13 a plethora of nationalisms
threatens Russian dominance at home' 4 and communist unity abroad. 15
The three fundamental features of the 1977 Constitution should
therefore be examined in relation to their theoretical and historical
background on the one hand, and to their contemporary context on the
other. Such an examination will reveal the 1977 Constitution as a docu-
ment of consolidation.
I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The Soviet constitution is the principal document of Soviet State
Law, 16 which deals with fundamental state legislation. 1 7 Several princi-
ples of Soviet State Law directly involve the Party, the federal structure
and the international position of the USSR. They thus reveal the impor-
tance of these three features of the USSR.
The leading role of the Party is seen as a basic condition of the
development of Soviet State Law. 18 Party directives are a source of Soviet
State Law. 19 "Democratic centralism," 20 the main functional principle of
nations, Prokop, supra note 8, at 104. A Soviet scholar writing in 1969 specifically asserts that "there
are no centrifugal forces" in the Soviet federal state, THE SOVIET STATE AND LAW, 103 (V.M.
Chkhikvadze ed. 1969).
13. See H. SKILLING & F. GRIFFITHS, INTEREST GROUPS IN SOVIET POLITICS (1971).
14. Rakowska-Harmstone, The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR, PROBLEMS OF COM-
MUNIsM, May-June 1974, at 1-22; Szporluk, Natsii SRSR u perspektyVt 2000 roku, SUCIIASNIST',
October 1977, at 76. For several recent examples of the relationship between modernization and
nationalism in the USSR, see the collection NATIONALISM AND HUMAN RIcHTS (I. Kamenetsky ed.
1977).
15. See Triska, Foreign Policy: Communist States and larties, in TnE: TWENTY-FIFTn CONoIuESS
OF THE CPSU, supra note 9, at 95-99.
16. There is debate on whether the term "state law" shouldbe replaced by "constitutional law."
For an exchange in the Soviet state law journal between the late Prof. A. I. Lepeshkin and Prof. V, F.
Kotok supporting, respectively, retention and replacement of the term "state law," see te section
entitled Polemika in SOvETsKOE GOSUDAEsTVO I PRAvo, February 1971, at 102-13. Partisans ofthe
latter view emphasize the programmatic aspect of a constitution. Although in the minority, they
apparently prevailed with regard to the 1977 Constitution. Sharlet, supra note 6, at 5-6.
17. According to modem Soviet legal theory, Soviet State Law determines the principles of
socialist law. Its sources are not only the Constitution of the USSR, but the Constitutions of the Union
and Autonomous Republics, as well as decrees (postanovleniia) and statutes (zakony) of the USSR and
republican Supreme Soviets, edicts (ukazy) of their Presidia, decrees of their Councils of Ministers,
joint decrees, CPSU directives, and the most important decisions of local Soviets. L. GnICORYAN &
I. DOLCOPOLov, FUNDAmENTALS OF SovIET STATE LAW 12-15 (B. Shchetinin ed. 1971) [hereinaf.
ter cited as GRIGORYAN & DOLGOPOLOV].
18. Id.
19. Id. For a hierarchy of Soviet legal acts, see Vanneman, The Hierarchy of Laws in the
Communist Party-State System in the Soviet Union, 8 INT'L L. 285.
20. See 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET LAw 221-22 (F. Feldbrugge ed. 1973).
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the CPSU, is aprinciple of State Law as well. 2' Since abasic characteristic
of the Soviet state structure is its federal form, some scholars consider
socialist federation, regional autonomy,2 2 self-determination and the
equality of peoples2 3 as major State Law principles. Others, conscious of
the USSR's role as aworld power, cite principles of foreign policy, such as
peaceful coexistence 24 and socialist internationalism. 25
A Soviet constitution can be examiped from an ideological as well as a
legal point of view. Legally, it is the "fundamental law."26 It is the prime
source of Soviet State Law,2 7 and prevails over the union-republican
constitutions and over statutes. 28 Ideologically, it is the expression of the
interests of the ruling class. It reflects the socio-economic system and the
correlation of class forces at a given historical moment.29
21. GRIGORYAN & DOLGOPOLOV, supra note 17, at 44.
22. E.g., S. S. Kravchuk, cited in GRIGORYAN & DOLGOPOLOV, supra note 17, at 44.
23. A. DENSOV & M. KnucHE ~o, Sovsrr STATE LAW 17-18 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
DENisOv & KnmcIrsNxo].
24. E.g., S.I. Ronin, cited in GLIGORYAN & DOLCOPOLOV, supra note 17, at44. For definitions of
some of these terms, see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET LAW, supra note 20. The relative importance of
these tenets may vary with time, since by virtue of its Marxist-Leninist character Soviet State Law
changes with historical conditions. As a result, new constitutions must appear from time to time.
In addition to the works on Soviet State Law cited in notes 12, 17 and 23, supra, see generally
SOVTSK OE KONSTrrUTSIONNOE Pavo (S. L Rusinova & V. A. Rianzhin eds. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as Rusinova & Rianzhin]; B. V. SiCHETININ, PROBLFMtY TEOns SOWrSKOGO
GosUDARsTVENNOcO PRAvA (1974); THE LAW OF THE SOVIET STATE (A. Y. Vyshinsky ed. 1948),
[hereinafter cited as Vyshinsky].
25. A general bibliography of Soviet legal literature is RussIAN AND SoVIET LAw (William E.
Butler ed. 1976). A general Soviet legal bibliography is IURIDICHESKAIA LITERATURA 1831-1970 (T.
E. Ksenzova ed. 1972). Two Soviet State Law bibliographies are SovETsKOE COSUDAnTN'E.OE
PRAVO-BIBLIOGRAFIIA 1917-57 (V.F. Kotok ed. 1958) and SOvETSKOE GOSUDARSWL%',NOE
(KONsTrruTsio,'OE) PRAVO-BIBLIOGRAFHIA 1957-70 (1972).
26. Osnovnoi Zakon.
27. V. A. Rianzhin states that the constitution is not the only fundamental law, and must therefore
be distinguished as the highest law, Rusinova & Rianzhin, supra note 24, at 46. For a description of
the legal function ofa Soviet constitution, see Vanneman, supra note 19, at 292. One may distinguish
between the "juridical" (written) constitution and the "political" constitution comprising actual
power relations; the former can further be divided into the "formal" constitution (the single Funda-
mental Law) and the "substantive" (consisting of legal norms ofconstitutional status), Meissner, Die
Verfassungsentwicklung der Sowietunion seit dem Tode Stalins, 22 JAHtRBUCH DES OFFEN'TLiCIIER
RECHTS DER GEGENWART 103-104 (new series) [hereinafter cited as Meissner].
28. DENssOv & KucHEKo, supra note 23, at 20; GriUoRYAN & DoLcOPOLOv, supra note 17,
at 21, 25.
29. DENISOV & KiicHENxo, supra note 23, at 19. According to Marxism-Leninism, history
progresses as a series of class conflicts. These conflicts require periodic constitutional expression.
Once socialism is achieved, however, these "contradictions" need no longer be "antagonistic." Class
conflict disappears along with classes in the new "state ofall the people." DEisvc & KuuCiENxO,
supra note 23, at 20; GRiGORYAN & DoLcOPOLOv, supra note 17, at 21, 22-24. For the theory of
non-antagonistic contradictions" see V. KOzLOvS U, ANTAcONISc A ND NON.,rAco.,nc
CoNTRADiCTiONS (1954). Mao Tse-Tung's 1957 "Hundred Flowers" speech applied this theory to
No. 2] U.S.S.R. CONSTrTUTION
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Three aspects of the Soviet concept of a constitution are particularly
conspicuous in the 1977 Fundamental Law. First, a Soviet constitution,
as both historical analysis and political program, exhibits the dual nature
characteristic of Marxism itself. 11 It interprets the past and reflects the
present while planning the future. Second, its programmatic points are
determined by the CPSU. The detailed and highly theoretical Party
Program is presented in the constitution in general legislative terms. 31
Third, a Soviet constitution is federal. It governs a union of theoretically
sovereign independent states, and prevails over their respective constitu-
tions.32 In sum, the Soviet constitution reflects the contemporary USSR
as a federal Party-state with a well-defined historical role.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Preamble of the 1977 Constitution speaks of "preserving the
continuity of the ideas and principles" of the three previous Soviet
constitutions.3 3 In a state purportedly governed according to Marxist-
Leninist ideology, historical continuity is essential. Each new step must
prove logical and consistent with past development. To evaluate the
"historical" as well as the "programmatic" aspect of the new Constitution
it is therefore necessary to survey its forebears.
The first Soviet constitution was adopted by the Russian Socialist
Federated Soviet Republic, hereinafter RSFSR, on July 10, 1918.3
4
relations between state and people as well as among classes. For a discussion, see Churchward,
Contemporary Soviet Theory of the Soviet State, 12 SOVIET STUDIES 407-10. For the text of Mao's
speech, see THE NEW COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 136-147 (D. Jacobs ed, 1961). The theory of
non-antagonistic contradictions serves to accommodate the application of the Marxist view of history
as class conflict to the conditions of an established socialist state. Khrushchev did not, however, speak
of conflicts between state and people. Meissner, supra note 27, at 110. Kotok and Farberov merely
speak of "variations in the disposition of social forces consisting of friendly classes," Kotok &
Farberov, The Constitution of the USSR-A Developing Fundamental UAwforSociety and the State,
SOVIET LAW AND GovERNwEiNT, winter 1973-1974, at 4 (trans. of article it SOVTSOE
COsuDAasTvO I PRAvO, June 1973, at 3).
30. See Rusinova & Rianzhin, supra note 24, at 64. Stalin and his theoretician A, Y. Vyshinsky
rejected the idea that a constitution is a program. "Soviet Constitutions," writes Vyshinsky, "repre-
sent the sum total of the historic path along which the Soviet state has travelled. At the same time,
they are the legislative basis of the subsequent development of state life. . . .Soviet constitutions
are not a program." Vyshinsky, supra note 24, at 87. This view has since been abandoned, Kotok &
Farberov, supra note 29, at 18. For a discussion ofprogrammatic elements in socialist constitutions,
see Shmailova, Pravovaia priroda programmnykh polozhenii sotslalistichesklkh konstitutsil,
SOVE'rSKOE CosUtDaisTvo I PAvo, May-June 1975, at 52. On the dual nature of Socialist constitu-
tions, see Z. BaZEZINSEI, THE SOVIET BLOC 77 (1967).
31. Rusinova & Rianzhin, supra note 24, at 52.
32. GRGoRYAN & DOLGOPOLOV, supra note 17, at 25, 20.
33. KONST. Preamble.
34. KONSTITTSIIA (Constitution) OF 1918 (RSFSR) [hereinafter cited as 1918 CONST,], In J.
TRisKA, CONSITUTIONS OF TUE CoMauNIsT PARTY-STATES 2(1968) [hereinafter cited as TMSKA].
[Vol. I
Together with the "October Decrees" of the first month of the Bolshevik
revolution, it formed an "aggregate" constitution of the Soviet state.35
The most famous of the October Decrees, Lenin's "Declaration of Rights
of the Laboring and Exploited People," was joined, on his suggestion, to
the constitution proper,36 and formed with it "a single Fundamental
Law" of the RSFSR.3 7 The Declaration proclaimed Russia a republic of
Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies organized on the
basis of "a free union of free nations, as a federation of Soviet national
republics." 38 It was followed by an announcement of the dictatorship of
the proletariat. 39 This constitution proclaimed the soviets' seizure of
political power, determined its distribution, and outlined socio-economic
policy.40 Headed by a Bolshevik declaration, 41 it was a document of
revolution.
The formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on De-
cember 30, 1922, necessitated a new constitution reflecting the "federal"
nature of the new state.42 Like its predecessor, the 1924 Constitution43
began with a declaration defining the new state and its tasks. 44 This
"Declaration of Union" set forth the reasons for creating a "voluntary
association of these sovereign nations on a basis of equality, each Republic
reserving to itself the right of free withdrawal from the Union."4 5 It was
followed by a Covenant of Union and eleven articles, most of which set
out the new federal state structure and delineated union and republican
competences. 4 6
The next twelve years saw the "victory of socialist social relations"
through Stalin's forced collectivization, industrialization and liquidation
of antagonistic classes. 47 Soviet society was entering the stage of con-
35. DENisov & KmicssNxo, supra note 23, at 36; GRIGORYAN & DOwopOLov, supra note 17,
at 18-19, 28-31.
36. CRIGORYAN & DOLGOPOLOV, supra note 17, at37. The Declaration had been published Nov.
16, 1917.
37. This was stated in the Preamble. TmsrA, supra note 34, at 2.
38. Id. at 2-14. For the evolution of the national territorial principle of Soviet federation
embodied in this constitution, see R. PiPES, THE FO=tATION OF TiE SovIET UNioN 111-12 (1968).
39. 1918 CONST. art. 2, ch. 5, para. 9, in Tfuss, . supra note 34, at 4.
40. 1918 CoNsr. in ThisKA, supra note 34, at 2.
41. For a discussion ofthe relation between the form and content ofa constitution, see Rusinova &
Rianzhin, supra note 24, at 52-55.
42. See generally P. PIPES, supra note 38. For an account ofthe debate on the national question, in
which Stalin's more centralist conceptions prevailed over Lenin's and were embodied in the 1924
Constitution, see id. at 269-93.
43. It was ratified by the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets on January 31, 1924.
44. KONSTITUTSIIA (Constitution) of 1924 (USSR) [hereinafter cited as 1924 Co.sT.] in TwsxA,
supra note 34, at 17.
45. Id., at 18.
46. ThssA, supra note 34, at 17-28; GRIGORYAN & DOLGOPOLOV, supra note 17, 37-40.
47. DENISOV & KIucHENKo, supra note 23, at 91; GmCOrYAN & DoLwoPOmov, supra note 17,
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summated socialism and nascent communism. 48 The new balance of class
forces required a new constitution. After publication of a draft and "dis-
cussion" by the public, a final text was approved on December 5, 1936.49
Three characteristics of this "Constitution of victorious socialism" 50
stand out in relation to the 1977 Constitution. First, the Communist
Party, the determining force in society and state, received but incidental
mention. 51 Second, the equality of nationalities was reaffirmed, 52 and the
competence of the Union Republics more fully defined. Third, the con-
cept of a constitution as a program was rejected. 53 As a result, no foreign
policy could be declared. 54
During the next forty years much important legislation and con-
sequent constitutional amendments were enacted. The Second World
War, conquest and annexation, "de-Stalinization," administrative re-
forms and counter-reforms, each left their constitutional marks. 55 Be-
at 91; J. STALIN, HISTORY OF THE ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (BotsHEVIKS): A SIIOUT CouItS.
331 (1938), quoted in Vyshinsky, supra note 24, at 124.
48. Id. Marxism-Leninism teaches that the workers' state must pass through two stages of
communism: the stage ofthe building ofsocialism, and the stage of the building ofominunisin, 110
first, characterized by the dictatorship of the proletariat and prolet.rian democracy, has been
subdivided into two phases: the phase of building the base of socialism, and that of building a
developed socialist society. The second stage, characterized by democracy for all the people In a
socialist state of all the people, also has been subdivided into two phases: that of building the material
and technical base of communism, and that of building a developed communist society. The last
phase culminates in popular communist self-administration, that is, in full communism. The USSR Is
now officially at the threshold of the second stage, and a new constitution is therefore appropriate,
Rusinova & Rianzhin, supra note 24, at 63-64; MATERIALY xxiv S'EZDA KPSS 38 (1971), quoted In
Rusinova & Rianzhin, supra note 24, at 64.
49. Vyshinsky, supra note 24, at 121-23. The promulgation of the 1977 Constitution followed
much the same procedure. See note 4, supra. For English translation of the 1936 Constitution, see
TnsKA, supra note 34, at 37. For English text as amended to 1965, see id. at 59. For English text as
amended to 1976, see CONSTITUTION (FUNDAMENTAL LAW) OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS (1976). For article-by-article analysis and commentary, see R. MAURACII, HANDIIUCII
DER SOWJETVERFASSUNG (1955). For a modem dissident's analysis, see Volpin, On the Constitution
of the USSR, in INSTITUTE ON SOCIALIST LAv, PAPERS ON Sovwr IAw (1977).
50. For a discussion ofthe main characteristics, see Vyshinsky, supra note 24, at 123-24 (paraphras-
ingj. STALIN, REPORTONTHE DRAFTOF THE USSR CONSTITUTION (1936)). See also GIIIOOItYAN &
DOLCOPOLOV, supra note 17, at 41-42; DENISOV & KIRICHENKO, supra note 23, at 91-97,
51. See note 105, infra.
52. KONSTITUTSUA (CONSTITUTION) OF 1936, ch. II, art. 13; ch. X, art. 123; chs. IV, VI (USSR)
[hereinafter cited as 1936 CONST.].
53. J. STALIN, REPORT ON THE DRAFT OF THE USSR CONSTITrrION 16 (1936), quoted In
Vyshinsky, supra note 24, at 87. Programmatic points are generally found in the preamble and first
few articles of a socialist constitution, Shmailova, supra note 30, at 54. The "Stalin Constitution,"
unlike its predecessors, had no such programmatic declaration.
54. The 1918 and 1924 Constitutions did indicate a foreign-policy program. See note 244, Infra,
55. Meissner counts 69 formal amendments between 1936 and 1972, 45 of them occurring since
1953. Meissner, supra note 27, at 125. Rianzhin states that between 1937 and 1974 there were around
[ol. 1
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tween 1936 and Stalin's death in March, 1953 the Union Republics were
increased in size and number due to Soviet territorial expansion. 5 G In
1944 they were empowered to carry on diplomatic relations with foreign
states as well as to maintain their own military formations. 57 Most of the
amendments made between 1953 and Khrushchev's fall in October, 1964
concerned the federal structure and the organs of state power and admin-
istration.58 The formal powers of the Union Republics were extended, 59
and there was considerable reshuffling of ministries.6"
While state legislation affected the constitution directly, Party activ-
ity bore long-term constitutional implications. As First Secretary of the
CPSU, Khrushchev advocated a stronger Party role.6' Just as the "dic-
tatorship of the proletariat" was to be replaced by the "state of the whole
people," so the CPSU would change from the "vanguard of the pro-
letariat" into the "Party of the whole people. "62 As such it would outlive
the state, surviving well into the period of communism. The state could
safely wither away, for in Khrushchev's view the Stalinist theory of
"capitalist encirclement" no longer held true.6 3 This ideological change
had important implications for Soviet foreign policy, since the achieve-
ment of communism at home was no longer held to require the destruc-
tion of the "imperialist camp" abroad. 64
Entry into the era of communist construction, Khrushchev declared
in January 1959, would require a major constitutional reform. 65 In Oc-
tober 1961, however, he announced that what was needed was a new
250 changes altogether, affecting 73 articles. Rusinova & Rianzhin, supra note 24, at 81. For a list of
amendments as of 1960, see DENISOV & KinucsENxo, supra note 23, at 375-409, excerpted in
TmsKA, supra note 34, at 54-58. For a discussion, see D..,;ISOV & KIIuCIEiCKO, supra note 23,
at 98-107; GRicoRYAN & DOLGOPOLOV, supra note 17, at 42-43; Rusinova & Rianzhin, supra note
24, at 81-83; Meissner, supra note 27, at 125-76.
56. See note 55, supra.
57. Statute (zakon) of Feb. 1, 1944. See V. VASILENKO & L LuKAsIIUK, UKRAI.I IA. SSR IN
CoNTENipoRARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 23-26 (1975); 1936 Co.T,. arts. 18 (a), 18 (b) (1944
USSR).
58. See note 55, supra.
59. 1936 CONST. ch. II (as amended 1957). See note 195, infra.
60. Id. chs. III-VI (as amended 1957). Other changes concerned the courts, the rights and duties of
citizens, and elections. Id. chs. IX-XI (as amended 1958). See note 195. infra.
61. Meissner, supra note 27, at 109-10.
62. Id. at 111.
63. Id. at 110. Under Stalin's theory, the surrnounding capitalist threatjustified the strengthening
of the Soviet state, and its protection from both external and internal threats.
64. RomashldnNovyietapvrazvitiiao~vtskogogosudarstVa, Sov.rsKOECOSUDAnsroPRAVO,
Oct. 1960, at31-40, trans. in CutmENT DIEST OF THE SovIEr PREss No. 40, at3-'7 (1960), reprinted
in TnisK, supra note 34, at 82.
65. Meissner, supra note 27, at 193.
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constitution altogether. 66 To this end a Constitutional Commission was
set up the next year, headed by the First Secretary himself.67
Meanwhile, legal scholars had begun to expand upon Khrushchev's
doctrines. In their view, the first stage of communism would be accom-
panied by growth of the Party's social influence, while the second stage
would see the fusion of all social groups into a homogeneous whole.08
Throughout both stages, State functions would gradually be transferred
to "mass public organizations," of which the CPSU was foremost. 69 Soviet
national groups, having begun to converge during tlhe first stage, would
merge fully in the second. 70
With Khrushchev's fall in October 1964, these legislative, ideologi-
cal and theoretical currents lost much of their impetus. De-Stalinization
66. Id. 193-94. For an excerpt from the 1961 CPSU Program, see THE SOVIET LEAL SYSTEM 0
(2d ed. J. Hazard, I. Shapiro & P. Maggs 1969).
67. Artemov, supra note 8, at 5. On the proposal ofthe Party Central Committee, the Supreme
Soviet passed a decree on the development of a draft constitution on April 25, 1962. Rusinova &
Rianzhin, supra note 21, at 84.
68. See the articlesby V.F. Kotok and D.A. Gaidukov in SOVLTY DEPUTATov ThuDmIASiCnttuISM,
No. 9, 1959, at 111, cited in TYsUKA, supra note 30 at 81; S.N. BaATUs' & M.S. SAMositGiiENXO,
OBSHCHAiATEoRnA SovETsxoco PRAvA 86,89-90 (1966), trans. and quoted in TIE SOVIET LEGAL
SYSTEM, supra note 66, at 12; GRIcORYAN & DOLCOPOLOV, supra note 17, at 43; Ruslnova &
Rianzhin, supra note 24, at 63; Kotok & Farberov, supra note 29, at 5. See also BERIAN, supra note 2,
at 281-84 (1963). Perhaps the most influential Soviet article, based on a lecture given at a July, 1960
conference in Moscow under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences' Institutes ofPhilosophy and of
State and Law, as well as of the local Party organization, was Romashkin, supra note 64, at 77. P. S.
Romashidn set forth eleven proposals for the revised constitution: it should (i) reflect the USSR's
world position, (2) announce a program, (3) re-define the social structure, (4) indicate the Party's role,
(5) describe the transformation of socialist property into communist property, (6) climlnato'taxes, (7)
extend the economic plan to the world socialist system, (8) re-characterize labor and the distribution
of goods, (9) extend and emphasize citizens' rights and duties, (10) extend union-republican rights
while fostering the drawing-together of nations, (11) reflect changes concerning state representative,
administrative, and judicial agencies, as well as government accountability and public discussion. Id.
As elaborated in the above and other studies, the characteristics of the approaching first stage of
communism were to be (1) the building of the material and technical base for communism, (2) the
increased role of the Communist Party as leader of the whole people, (3) the education (vospitanie) of
the masses in preparation for self-administration through non-juridical norms, (4) the Increased
participation of the masses in state administration through various public organizations on a voluntary
basis, (5) the gradual eradication of the distinction between state and society, (6) the merger of the
rights and the duties of citizens, (7) total, direct democracy, and (8) the gradual convergence of
various social and national groups. These conditions would prepare the way for the second, final stage
of communism, which would culminate after an indeterminate time in total communism on a world
scale. This second stage would be characterized by (1) the gradual withering-away of the state, (2) te
transfer of state functions to public mass oiganizations, (3) public self-administration on a voluntary
basis, without coercion, (4) the transfbrmation of juridical norms of social behavior Into norms of
.,communist morality," (5) the complete merger of all social and national groups into a homogeneous
society of a new type.
69. See Romashkin, supra note 68, at 78, 84.
70. Id. 87; Kotok & Farberov, supra note 29, at 16.
ground to a halt.71 Many of Khrushchev's reforms were undone.72 Al-
though Party theoreticians continued to elaborate upon his theses, the
Constitutional Commission was slow to embody them in a new Funda-
mental Law. 73 It was only after more than a dozen years and two major
re-shuflings of its membership that the Commission produced the draft
of a new USSR constitution.74
III. THE PRINCIPAL CHANGES AND
THEIR SIGNIFICANCE
Numerous changes are embodied in the 1977 draft constitution and
in the final text. 75 They can be classified as formal, quantitative and
substantive.
The formal changes are considerable. 76 Most apparent is the new
structure: instead of thirteen chapters divided into articles, there is a
preamble, as in the 1918 and 1924 constitutions, followed by nine parts,
with all but the last two divided into chapters. 77 The clear division
between society and state implicit in the structure of the 1936 constitu-
tion has been eliminated.78 Similarly, the distinction betveen state
power and administration has been de-emphasized. 79 The chapter on
citizens' rights and duties has been moved forward and joined with a
chapter on citizenship in a new part on the state and the individual.80 The
71. Meissner, supra note 27, at 117.
72. For some examples of re-centralization, see note 211, infra.
73. Artemov, supra note 8, at 5. Artemov notes that "Stalin's successors took 16 years to revise
what Stalin had prepared in 16 months." Professor Hazard suggests that the content ofa draft ofa new
Chinese constitution which appeared in 1970 removed the need for Soviet haste in producing a
competing constitution, Hazard, Communist Constitutionalism in a New Form, STUDIEs Iw Com-
pARATivE Co~muiNIsm, Jan. 1971, at 114. It has even been suggested that Khrushchev's less
theoretically-minded successors were not particularly enthusiastic about drawing up a new constitu-
tion, Gilison, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, 'and Constitutional Reform, PnOLEtS OF CoitamtuIsis,
Sept.-Oct. 1972, at 69.
74. For English translation, see Moscow News, June 11, 1977, at 1 (Supp.). Ile Russian text was
published as KoNs'rruTsuA (OsNovNoI ZAXON) SOluzA SovErsImI SOTSALISumICISKa1 REs-
PuBLIK (1977).
75. See table.
76. For the significance of form, see note 41, supra.
77. KONST.
78. 1936 CONST. chs. I-i; DRAFT. This corresponds to theory, Kotok & Farberov, supra note 29,
at 6.
79. 1936 CONST. chs. III-VI; KONsT. pts. V-VI.
80. 1936 CONST. ch. X; KONST. pL IL On the significance of the more prominent position of this
chapter in the draft, see the interview with Professor M. A. Krutogolov, Der Spiegel, Sept. 5,1977,
at 140.
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chapter on the electoral system has also been moved forward, and joined
with two other chapters in a part on the Soviets of People's Deputies.81
This emphasizes the development of "socialist democracy" through a
system of elected soviets. 82
Another type of formal change is the alteration of chapter titles.
Thus, the word "fundamentals"8 3 has been added in the first and sixth
parts, clearly defining the functions of the provisions therein and lending
the document the dignity of generality. 84 The chapter title "Fundamental
Rights and Duties of Citizens" has been renamed "Fundamental Rights,
Freedoms and Duties of Citizens of the USSR" and incorporated into a
part bearing the new title "The State and the Individual."85 These
changes advertise the broadening of individual liberty promised by ideol-
ogy. The chapter title "The State Structure" has been changed to "The
National-State Structure."86 The new name calls attention to the federal
multinational form of the USSR.
Other changes concern the chapters themselves. Four are entirely
new.87 Two other chapters incorporate previous material. 88 Another two
were formed by splitting and supplementing a chapter of the previous
constitution.8 9 Additionally, there are many new individual articles.00
Articles of the 1936 Constitution have been eliminated, 91 combined 92
and divided, 93 while the language of many has been supplemented, 4
reduced95 or modified. 96 An innovation is the reference in some articles
to specific laws, such as the Law on the Supreme Court and the Law on
Procuratorial Supervision.97
81. KONST. pt. IV.
82. See BREZHNEV, supra note 8, at 14.
83. Osnovy.
84. KONST. pts. I, VI.
85. 1936 CONST. ch. X; KONST. pt. II, ch. 7.
86. 1936 CONST ch. II; KONST pt. III.
87. KONST. pt. I, chs. 3, 4, 5; pt. IV, ch. 12.
88. Id. pt. II, ch. 6; pt. IV, ch. 14.
89. 1936 CONST. ch. IX; KONST. pt. VII, chs. 20, 21.
90. See table.
91. E.g., 1936 CONST. ch. II, art. 18(b).
92. E.g., id. ch. III, arts. 42-45, combined in KONST. pt. V, ch. 15, art. 111.
93. E.g., 1936 CONST. ch. IX, art. 111, split into KONST. pt. VII, ch. 20, arts. 157, 15S,
94. E.g., 1936 CONST. ch. V, art. 65, supplemented in KONST. pt. V, ch. 16, art. 130.
95. E.g., the famous maxim, "He who does not work shall not eat" (adapted from 2 Thessalonlans,
3:10), 1936 CONST. ch. I, art. 12, deleted in KONST. pt. I, ch. 2, art. 14.
96. E.g., Soviets of Working People's Deputies, 1936 CONST. ch. I, art. 3, are now Soviets of
People's Deputies, KoNsT. pt. I, ch. 1, art. 2; id. pt. IVpassim. This is in line with the establishment
of the "'state of the whole people."
97. KONST. pt. VII, ch. 20, art. 153 and id. pt. VII, ch. 21, art. 168, respectively,
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Quantitatively, the 1936 Constitution of 146 articles has been en-
larged, first to 173 articles in the draft, then to 174 in the final text. 98
It is in the substantive changes, however, that the fundamental new
features of the 1977 Constitution most clearly appear. Pronouncements of
the drafters themselves emphasize the provisions on the role of the Party,
the powers of the Union Republics, and the international position of the
Soviet Union.99 In his report to the Party Central Committee, which he
delivered along with the draft as chairman of the Constitutional Commis-
sion, -00 L. I. Brezhnev referred to the increased role of the CPSU.10 1 He
called attention to the new definition of the USSR as an "integral federal
multinational state," and to the new provisions for Union Republics'
initiative and participation in the central government.' 02 The Preamble
of the new constitution, which presumably reflects the drafters' main
concerns, cites ensuring national security, strengthening peace, and
developing international cooperation as immediate state tasks.' 03 The
concluding section refers to the "international responsibilit3" of the
Soviet people. 1°4
A. THE LEADING ROLE OF THE CPSU
In contrast to its predecessors, the new constitution gives striking
prominence to the CPSU. s0 5 In the very first clause of the Preamble, it
mentions Lenin's Communist Party as leader of the Bolshevik revolu-
tion. 10 6 It further declares that "the leading role of the Communist Party,
vanguard of the whole people, has grown."' 0 7 Article 6 proclaims the
98. 1936 CONST.; DRAF-r; KONST.
99. See notes 100, 103, infra.
100. L. I. BREszNE'v, supra note 8.
101. Id. at 12.
102. Id. at 19-21.
103. KONST. Preamble.
104. Id.
105. In the previous Constitution, by contrast, the Party was mentioned in only two places. In
connection with the right ofassociation, it was named as a mass organization in which the most active
and politically conscious citizens would unite, and as the vanguard of the working people and leading
core of all their organizations. As part of Article 126, this language was relatively inconspicuous. See
1936 CONST. ch. X, art. 126. The 1977 counterpart of Article 126 is Article 51 which, however, is
shorter and does not mention the Party or any other public organizations. See KONSr, pL II, ch. 7,
art. 51. The only other mention of the Party in the old constitution %%as in Article 141. where Party
organizations were named among those empowered to choose candidates for elections. See 1936
CONST. ch. XI, art. 141. The corresponding Article 100 of the new constitution likewise lists the Party
first. See KONST. pt. IV, ch. 13, art. 100.
106. KONST. Preamble.
107. Id. For Party history, see generally L. ScHAPmo, TaE Cos. tiNIsr PANTY OF TuE SOVIET
UNION. For a description of its organization and function, see L ScAPmo, TAE COVEMNiw.r Am
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party to be not only the "leading and guiding force" of society, but also the
"nucleus of its political system" as well as of "all state and public organiza-
tions.' 0 8 The second paragraph of Article 6 describes the Party's role as
ideological guide and planner.10 9
Two new constitutional provisions indirectly reflect the Party's
stronger role. Under the new Article 90, elections to the Union and
republican Supreme Soviets will be held at intervals of five rather than
four years. "10 The resulting synchronization with the quinquennial Party
congresses"'l may symbolize as well as expedite a further meshing of
Party and state. Secondly, the creation of a vice-presidential post in the
Presidium facilitates the combination of the highest state and Party
positions. "12 In this way, the constitution serves to formalize the hitherto
unofficial rule of the CPSU.
This results logically from Soviet ideology. While Lenin did not feel
that the Party's role should be mentioned in the constitution" 3 - indeed
POLITICS OF THE SOVIET UNION, ch. 3 (1967). For an analysis of its legal relation to the state, sae
Meissner, Party Supremacy: Some Legal Questions, 14 P103LEMS OF COMMUNISM, March-April
1965, 28.
108. KONST. pt. I, ch. 1, art. 6, para. 1.
109. Id. para. 2. This may be taken both as a statement ofpresent fict and as a programmatic
declaration. Programmatic rules generally appear in the preamble and first few articles of a constitu-
tion, and cannot be contradicted by subsequent norms, Shmailova, supra note 30, at 54, It should be
noted, however, that in the immediately following Article 7 it is stated that other public organizations
shall participate in state and public administration and in resolving political, economic, social and
cultural questions. Articles 7 and 100 (guaranteeing other organizations the right to nominate
candidates) could thus be taken to sanction other political parties. Yet this right theoretically has
existed throughout the period ofsocialism. Professor Krutogolov has said in an interview that no one
would be punished for proposing to found another political party, such as a peasants' party, as long as
it supported the same communist aims as the CPSU. An anti-Soviet party would ofcourso be out of
the question. Der Spiegel, Sept. 5, 1977, at 142. But see B. V. SHCHIITININ, supra note 24, at
117-119. The author asserts that in the socialist state more than one political party Is allowed as long as
it recognizes the dictatorship of the proletariat. He ascribes the one-party system in the USSR to the
failure of other parties to gain support or participate in the government, to popular will, and to the
alleged fact that the CPSU represents the interests of the whole people. Bourgeois parties, lie
explains, cannot exist in socialist countries because they no longer have a class basis, Id. Since
non-"working" classes have officially been eliminated in the Soviet Union, and all the working people
are represented by the CPSU, there can be no class basis for another party. It therefore appears that
even ifone could found a second political party, it would not be officially recognized as such. Professor
Krutogolov's statement, even with its qualifications, seems both misleading and insignificant. For the
account ofan alleged attempt to organize a political party in the USSR in 1959, see note 137, Infra.
110. KONsT. pt. IV, ch. 12, art. 90.
111. Artemov, supra note 8, at 7.
112. KONST. pt. V, ch. 15, art. 120.
113. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOvIET LAW, supra note 20, at 143. He did, however, advocate a
leading role for the Party in a system of"socialist democracy." V. I. LENIN, 39 POLNOII SOnnANI.
SOCHINENIi 295-96, cited in Guliev & Shchiglik, Partiia i gosudarstvo v slsteme sovetskol sotslalls-
ticheskoi demokratii, SOvzarsKoE GOSuDAIsTvO I PRuvo, April 1975, at 16, See also Wolfe,
Leninism, in MARXIsM IN THE MODEN WORLD 45, 76-89 (M. Drachkovitch ed. 1965).
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the 1918 and 1924 constitutions make no such mention - Soviet legal
theoreticians consider the Party Statute to be the core of the substantive
constitutional law of the state. 1 4 Formal recognition of the Party's role
figured prominently in the discussion of constitutional reform begun in
1959.115 In his July, 1960 report P. S. Romashkin stated that the transfer
of state functions to public organizations and the development of com-
munist morality required a greater Party role, which should be reflected
in "two or three places" in the constitution, namely, in the introductory
part, and in the sections on the social structure and on citizens' rights and
duties. 116 At a January, 1969 meeting of the All-Union Scientific Research
Institute for Soviet Legislation, V. E. Guliev expressed the opinion that
the Party's leading role exhibits not only a political but also a
constitutional-law character. 117 It was clear that this role would be recog-
nized in the new constitution." 8
The doctrine of a stronger Party role has been linked to that of
democratization. While this relationship may appear paradoxical, it de-
pends on the special meaning of "socialist democracy.""19 Since the Party
is recognized as the representative of the people's interests, popular
participation in its decision-making would be superfluous. Rather, the
"democratic" element of "socialist democracy" refers to the implementa-
tion of basic Party decisions. The people's primary role is to administer.
In this light, assertions that the Party ensuies socialist democracy, that its
growing role actually makes possible the development of the organs of
popular representation, and even "reflects the breadth and depth of
socialist democracy," are perfectly reasonable.12 0 The practical effect of
this "democratization of a new type" is that in the "developed socialist
114. Meissner, supra note 27, at 30.
115. See note 68, supra.
116. Romashldn, supra note 68 at 84. The suggestion was carried out. Indeed, the idea of again
having a preamble was advocated by Romashkin and his colleagues, Meissner, supra note 107, at 196.
Nevertheless, the opinions of scholars are not always indicative of official policy. According to
Meissner, Romashldn and Denisov were the only constitutional lawyers on the Constitutional
Commission, and both were eliminated in the re-organization of December 19, 1966. Id. at 198. On
the other hand, this does seem to testify to the strengthened role of the Party.
117. Meissner, supra note 27, at 200.
118. Soviet jurists point to the recent constitutions of "brotherly socialist countries," such as the
1971 Bulgarian and the 1972 Hungarian constitutions, which give greater emphasis to the Party's
role. Mikhaleva, Konstitutsionnoe zakonodaterstoo zarubez-hnykh sotslallsticheskidh stran perioda
postroeniia razvitogo sotsializma, PRAVOVEDENIE, May-June 1975. at 48.
119. For a definition ofsociahist democracy, see 1 ENCYCLOPEDu OF SOVEr w , supra note 20,
at 220. Guliev and Shehiglik describe democracy in a developed socialist society as representing the
will of all classes and layers of society insofar as they coincide with the interests of the working class,
Guliev & Shchiglik, supra note 113, at 16.
120. Kositsyn, Gosudarstoo razoitogo sotsialisticheskogo obshchestoa, SOTSALwSnCIES.AIA
ZAxoNNosT', July, 1977, at 11.
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society" of the present, the masses must undergo a "drawing-in" 121 into
the administration and decision-making of state and society. 122 Simulta-
neously, the Party must cultivate in them a "communist social conscious-
ness." 123 It appears that the people may participate in government to the
extent that they conform to Party norms.
This type of democratization is a vital element of the Soviet historical
scheme. It is a prerequisite to the transfer of state functions to social
organizations, and to the general convergence of state and society. 124
These processes are accompanied by a convergence of Party and state, for
although at present the two must remain legally distinct, 125 Leninism
demands that in the final stage of commjinism the state, in effect, be
transformed into the Party. 126 The process that emerges from these
doctrines is clear: as the state merges with society, it is metamorphosed
into the Party, creating a new entity, a fusion of Party and society.
The practical effect of both doctrine and constitution is a strengthen-
ing of the Party. With the passing of the dictatorship of the proletariat and
the waning of the state, power must pass to some other entity. This entity
is the CPSU. Despite emphatic Soviet denial,' 2 7 the inevitable result,
now constitutionally legitimized, appears to be a dictatorship of the Party
- at least, until men learn to govern themselves without coercion. 128
121. Vovlechenie.
122. See Kositsyn, supra note 120, at 6, 8.
123. This was demanded by the 1961 Party Statute as well as by the decisions of the XXIII and
XXIV Party Congresses, Kotok & Farberov, supra note 29, at 16.
124. This is reflected in the GDR Constitution of 1968, which has in this sense been taken as a
model for the new Soviet constitution, Kotok & Farberov, supra note 29, at 6-11. For the role of law In
the transfer of state functions to social organizations, see BEnRMA N, supra note 2, at 281-82;
Schlesinger, Social Law-4, 12 SOVIET STUDIES 56, especially at 79, mad Social Law-l, 12 SOVIE.T
STUDIES 145.
125. Guliev & Shchiglik, supra note 113, at 17.
126. BERNMAN, supra note 2, at 281. Prof. Berman concludes that this doctrine is designed to
symbolize a twin policy of (1) extending Party influence and (2) drawing more people into public
administration "in order to strengthen the society and eliminate the shortcomings of a rigid bureauc-
ratism." Id. at 91.
127. Kositsyn, supra note 120, at 11. Prof. Kositsyn describes the Party as a force which can "unify
. . . manifestations of democracy into one current and direct it into the necessary channel, In tile
interests of the whole people." He refers to the new constitution in this connection. Id.
128. See Artemov, supra note 8, at 9, col. 1. A well-known Soviet dissident holds the same view,
Bukovsky,An Appeal to the Heads of State and Government of the Thirty-Five Countries that Signed
the Helsinki Agreements, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS. October 13, 1977, at 44, col. 1. A
Soviet scholar writing in 1969 throws some indirect light on the official view of the Party's role In the
period of total communism. He refers to Lenin's comparison of the Party to a conductor who directs
the orchestra but does not actually play the instruments. Two pages later, in a description of the
future communist society which avoids all mention of the Party, he characterizes the prevailing
power and authority as not political but "akin to those ofan orchestra conductor." TIE SOVIET STATE
AND LAW, supra note 12, at 86, 88-89. The implication is unmistakable.
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B. A UNITARY, FEDERAL AND MULTINATIONAL STATE
Numerous modifications in the 1977 Constitution serve to re-define
the powers of the Union Republics and the rights of the nations inhabiting
them. On the one hand, the Constitution represents the static principles
of sovereignty, socialist federation and national self-determination as a
symbolic right assuring equality. On the other, it declares a dynamic
policy of development, convergence and merger of peoples. Parts III, IV,
and VI, dealing with the national-state structure and the union and
republican organs of state power and administration, generally reflect the
former. 129 The latter appears in the Preamble and in certain articles of
Parts I, II, and VII, concerning the social-political-economic structure,
the state and the individual, and justice.' 30 The first group contains
adjustments in the federal balance of power, some favoring the center,
others the Republics. The second group presents a nationality program of
ultimately centralizing import.
1. The Powers of the Union Republics
Of the sections on the federal structure and organs, Part Ill is
central. Chapter 8 defines the Soviet federal state.13 ' Article 70 declares
the USSR to be a "unitary, federal and multinational state."' 32 The
historical basis of the Union is the self-determination of nations; its legal
basis is socialist federalism. 133 Both legally and historically, the union is
purportedly voluntary.134 In its second paragraph, the article emphasizes
the unity of the Soviet nations. 135
Article 72, declaring the Union Republics' right to secede from the
USSR, is not new but rather is significant in its survival through three
constitutions. 136 Repeatedly advocated by Lenin as a symbol of free and
equal union, it remains purely symbolic. 13 7
129. KONST. pts. III, IV, VI.
130. Id. pts. I,II, VII.
131. Id. pt. Im, ch. 8.
132. Id. pt. III, ch. 8, art. 70.
133. id.
134. Id.
135. DBAFr pt. III, ch. 8, art. 69; KONST. pt. III, ch. 8, art. 70.
136. KONSTITUTSIIA (constitution) OF 1923 art. 2, para. 4 (USSR); 1938 CoNST. ch. 11, art. 17;
KONST. pt. III, ch. 8, art. 72.
137. See note 191 and accompaning text, infra. Soviet scholars emphasize the unlimited and
irrevocable nature of this right. Claiming that no Republic has desired io exercise it, they present this
as evidence of the "monolithic" nature of the Soviet federal state. E.g., Vyshinsy. supra note 24, at
103. But see the account ofa 1959 attempt to exercise the secession right in UkcnALn'exI IunlYSTY PAD
SuDoM KGB (I. Maistrenko ed. 1968). The seven members of the "jurists7 group" were accused of
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Article 73, defining Union jurisdiction, exhibits some reorganiza-
tion. New clauses empower the Union to establish uniform legislative
regulation throughout the country, to pursue an integral social and
economic policy, and to determine the USSR's relations with interna-
tional organizations.' 38 The new Article 75 affirms the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the USSR. 3 9
Chapter 9 specifically concerns the Union Republics. The new first
paragraph of Article 76 defines a Union Republic as a sovereign Soviet
socialist state. 140 In the second paragraph, based on previous Article 15
and declaring the Republics' right to exercise state authority, the adverb
"independently" 141 has been moved forward, affording greater promi-
nence. 1 42 In the third paragraph, however, on the republican constitu-
tions, the phrases "with due account for the features of the Republic" and
"in conformity with the Constitution of the USSR" have been inter-
changed, thus emphasizing the latter requirement. 143
Article 77 is entirely new. 144 The first paragraph grants each Union
Republic the right to participate in resolving questions within USSR
jurisdiction.' 45 The second correspondingly assigns to it the duty to
facilitate the exercise of Union power, and to ensure comprehensive
economic and social development on its territory, evidently as part of
all-Union integration. 146 A third paragraph added in the final text con-
cerns coordination and control of enterprises, institutions, and organiza-
tions of Union subordination on questions within the Republics' jurisdic-
tion. 147
The predecessor of Article 80, on a Union Republic's fbreign affairs
activity, was created by virtue of a 1944 law which made all the Union
Republics potential subjects of international law, enabled two of them to
forming the "Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Party" in order to advocate secession of the Ukrainian
SSR from the Soviet Union. Their leader, a lawyer and Party member named Lev Lukiancnko, was
tried for treason and sentenced to death. The sentence was commuted to fifteen years of Imprison-
ment. After his release in 1976, Mr. Lukianenko continued to defend Ukrainian national rights as a
member of the Kiev Group to Promote the Implementation ofthe Helsinki Accords. Considered by
the authorities to be an especially dangerous state criminal, he was again arrested December 12,
1977. N. Y. Times, December 24, 1977, at 3, col. 5.
138. KONST. pt. III, ch. 8, art. 73 (4), (5), (10). Its predecessor is 1936 CONsT. ch, II, art. 14.
139. KONST. pt. III, ch. 8, art. 75.
140. Id. pt. III, ch. 9, art. 76, para. 1. The word "sovereign" was added in the final text.
141. Samostoiatel'no.
142. Id. pt. III, ch. 9, art. 76, para. 2.
143. Id. para. 3.
144. Id. pt. III, ch. 9, art. 77.
145. Id. para. 1.
146. Id. para. 2. The latter duty was added in the final text.
147. Id. para. 3.
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developalimitedintemationallegalpersonality, andgave the Soviet Union
two extra seats in the United Nations.' 48 The new version contains the
additional phrase "participate in the activity of international organiza-
tions.' 49 Aside from the practical advantages for the USSR, this addition
fulfills the theoretical requirement that the Soviet nations' state forms
receive the fullest development.
The final phrase of Article 15, stating that the USSR shall protect the
Republics' sovereign rights, is now given separate recognition as Article
81.150 It has been re-phrased, however, in the passive voice.1 51 This
article closes Chapter 9.
But here there is a striking omission. The companion to the pre-
decessor of Article 80, former Article 18(b), has no counterpart in the new
constitution. 152 Article 18(b), based like its companion on a 1944 statute,
read as follows: "Every Union Republic shall have its own republican
military formations."'15 3 This wartime gift to the loyal Republics was
indeed a temporary measure. Theoretically, its revocation should further
national uniformity. Practically, it permits further centralization.1 54
Part V, on the higher organs of state power and administration of the
Union,' 55 is divided into chapters on the Supreme Soviet and the Council
of Ministers. 156 Article 112 is noteworthy. While previously the Pre-
sidium could convene extraordinary sessions of the Supreme Soviet at its
148. Id. pt. II, ch. 9, art. 80. See note 195, infra. 1936 CoNsT. ch. II, art. 18. See Uibopuu,
International Legal Personality of Union Republics of USSR, 24 INrL & Co.IP. LQ. 811 (1975)
(abridging and translating H. J. UIBoPuu, DIE V5LKERREciTSSrUJEKTIVITAT DER UNIONS-
REPUBLI ENDERUdSSR(1975). AtypicalSovietwork, emphasizing the international legalpersonality
of a Union Republic, is V. VASiLENKO & I. LUKASHuK, THE UtRA4INLV USSR IN CO. rT.ENoAnY
INTLrNATIONAL RELATIONS (1975).
149. But USSR jurisdiction, which formerly governed USSR representation in international
relations as well as general procedure fbr union-republican foreign relations, 1936 CO.sT. ch. 1, art.
14 (1), is now extended to USSR as well as union-republican relations with international organiza-
tions. KONST. pt. HI, ch. 8, art. 73 (10). The Republics' new right under Article 80 is thereiore as
much subject to USSR control as the old foreign-relations right. That right, furthermore, is no longer
reinforced by the republican Supreme Soviets' right to establish representation in international
relations, 1936 CONST. ch. IV, art. 60 (5); KONST. pt. VI, ch. 17, art. 137. See note 148 supra. On the
practical insignificance of previous art. 60 (5), see R. MAuRACH, supra note 49, at 213-14, 110-11.
150. KONST. pt. III, ch. 9, art. 81.
151. Id. See also 1936 CONST. ch. 1, art. 15.
152. 1936 CONST. ch. H, art. 18 (b). But this article had little practical effect. I. MAURACII, supra
note 49, at 115.
153. Id. See note 57, supra, note 195, infra.
154. For commentary on this omission, see Artemov, supra note 8, at 7, col. 1.
155. We shall not deal with the chapters on the Autonomous Republics (pt. III, ch. 10), Regions
and Areas (pt. III, ch. 11), which have three and two entirely new articles, respectively. The word
vysshie in the title of part V can be translated as either "higher" or "highest;" Soviet translations
prefer the former.
156. KONST. pt. V, chs. 15, 16.
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discretion or on proposal by a Union Republic, Article 112 now addition-
ally provides for a convocation on the recommendation of at least one
third of the deputies of either chamber.1 57 Insofar as the Chamber of
Nationalities represents the interests of the Union Republics, this is an
extension of their power.
Article 113 is mostly new. It grants the right to initiate legislation in
the Supreme Soviet to the Union Republics, among others, as repre-
sented by their higher organs of state power. 158 The last paragraph of the
next article, which continues the description of legislative procedure,
allows a Union Republic to recommend that a draft law be submitted for
public discussion or vote.159
Part VI sets forth the union-republican structure of representative
and administrative state organs. ' 60 Chapter 17 begins with Article 137,
which defines the powers of the Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic. 101
According to the new second paragraph, these powers are derived from
the constitutions of the USSR and the given Union Republic. ' 62 The third
paragraph, enumerating matters within the republican Supreme Soviet's
exclusive competence, omits three specific powers found in its predeces-
sor.1 63 First, the exercise of the right of amnesty and pardon is no longer
listed.' 64 By the 1936 Constitution, the amnesty power came under
general USSR jurisdiction, ' 65 while the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Soviet was specifically empowered to grant pardon. 166 A union-republican
Supreme Soviet could, however, grant amnesty and pardon to citizens
sentenced by the Republic's judicial bodies. ' 67 Now, the Presidium of the
USSR Supreme Soviet is specifically empowered to grant amnesty as well
as pardon,' 68 while the union-republican Supreme Soviets are empow-
157. 1936 CONST. ch. III, art. 46; DRAFr pt. V, ch. 15, art. 100; KONST. pt. V, ch. 15, art. 112. In
the final text the old phrase "oron a proposal by a Union Republic" was placed before rather than after
this new phrase, apparently to emphasize republican rights. Id.
158. KONST. pt. V, ch. 15, art. 113.
159. Id. pt. V, ch. 15, art. 114, the second paragraph ofwhich is based on 1936 CONST. ch. III, art,
39. The last paragraph is new.
160. KONST. pt. VI.
161. 'Entitled "Fundamentals of the Structure of the Organs ofState Power and Administration In
the Union Republics," Part VI is divided into three chapters corresponding to the Union-Republic,
Autonomous-Rfepublic, and local levels, of which only the first shall here be discussed. KONST. pt,
VI, ch. 17, art. 137 combines, alters and supplements 1936 CONST. ch. IV, arts, 57, 59 and 60,
162. KONST. pt. VI, ch. 17, art. 137, para. 2.
163. Id. pt. VI, ch. 17, art. 137, para. 3.
164. 1936 CONST. ch. IV, art. 60 (4); KONST. pt. VI, ch. 17, art. 137.
165. 1936 CONST. ch. II, art. 14 (24).
166. Id. ch. IH, art. 49 (10).
167. Id. ch. IV, art. 60 (4).
168. KONST. pt. V, ch. 15, art. 121 (11).
[VCol.
ered to do neither.169 Second, while the Union Republics retain the
right to enter into bilateral foreign relations and may now also participate
in international organizations,' 70 their Supreme Soviets no longer have
the right to establish their representation in such international rela-
tions. 17 1 Third, the omission of former Article 18(b) has nullified the
section granting the Republics the power to determine the organization of
their military formations.' 72 The USSR Supreme Soviet, however, now
has the power to form a central Council of Defense. 1 73
New powers granted the republican Supreme Soviets in Article 137
are the power to ratify plans for social development, to form organs
accountable to them, and to submit laws to referenda. 174
Article 138 omits detailing the composition of the Presidium of a
Union Republic and leaves this question to the republican constitu-
tion. 17  An added appositive phrase describes the organ's function and
accountability. 176
2. Nationality Policy
Changes in other parts of the Fundamental Law concern the nations
inhabiting the Union Republics. The historical section of the Preamble
declares that the Soviet power has ended national enmity, and praises the
unification of the Soviet republics in the USSR. 77 It states further on that
the friendship among nations has been consolidated. A "new historical
community of people, the Soviet people" has appeared "on the basis of
the drawing-together of all social layers and classes,' 17 8 as well as of the
juridical and actual equality of all nations and nationalities, and their
cooperation. 179
The drawing-together of social groups evidently precedes the con-
vergence of nations. National differences will presumably remain for
169. Id. pt. VI, ch. 17, art. 137.
170. 1936 CONST. ch. II, art. 18 (a); KONST. pt. VI, ch. 17, art. 137.
171. See note 149 and accompanying text, supra.
172. 1936 CONST. ch. IV, art. 60 (6); KONST. pt. VI, ch. 17, art. 137.
173. KONST. pt. V, ch. 15, art. 121 (14). Compare 1936 CONSTr. ch. II. art. 14 (7).
174. KONST. pt. VI, ch. 17. art. 137, para. 3, 4.
175. id. pt. VI, ch. 17, art. 138. Compare 1936 CoNSr. ch. IV, art. 61. While this appears to be a
grant of power to the Union Republics, it should be remembered that the republican constitutions
must conform to that of the USSR. KONrST. pt. III, ch. 8, art. 73 (11).
176. KONST. pt. VI, ch. 17, art. 138. The republican Presidium is described as "a continuously
functioning agency of the Union-Republic Supreme Soviet that is accountable to the latter for all its
activity." Id.
177. KONST. Preamble. The latter sentence was added in the final text.
178. In the final text the phrase "and classes" was added, emphasizing the idea that in the period of
socialism there remained two classes, workers and peasants. See 1936 Co.sr. ch. I, art. 1.
179. This last phrase was added in the final text.
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some time after all class distinctions have disappeared. Indeed, nowhere
does the Preamble mention a national drawing-together. Yet the next
paragraph, describing the working people as "patriots and inter-
nationalists," implies that merely ethnic patriotism has already been
supplanted by loyalty to the multinational Soviet state and the world
communist movement.' 80 The apparently paradoxical phrase expresses
the "dialectical" unity of internationalism and Soviet patriotism.
While the Preamble does not mention the doctrine of development
and convergence of nations, the first article of the new chapter on "Social
Development and Culture" declares it directly.18' The state shall create the
conditions for, interalia, the"all-rounddevelopment and drawing-together
of all nations and nationalities of the USSR."' 8 2
Just how the state is to create such conditions is indicated at various
places in the document. 18 3 Prominently placed is a new article stating
that the USSR economy shall be an "integral national-economic com-
plex."' 8 4 This is the material basis and prime condition for the con-
vergence of nations. Similarly, Article 25 establishes a "uniform system of
education." 8 5 Such a system would facilitate closer control over national
culture and consciousness.
Relevant articles also concern citizens' rights, freedoms and duties.
One of the new duties of every citizen is to respect the national dignity of
others and to fortify the friendship of the Soviet nations and
nationalities.' 8 6 Under Article 36, as before, citizens of different races
and nationalities are promised equal rights. ' 87 But a new paragraph of
that article restates the basic policy:
The exercise of these rights shall be ensured by the policy of all-round
development and drawing-together of all nations and nationalities of the
USSR, education of citizens in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist
internationalism, and the opportunity for using the mother tongie and the
languages of the other peoples of the USSR.188
Language, the prime manifestation of nationality as well as a princi-
pal means of preserving it, is treated somewhat differently in an article
180. KONST. Preamble.
181. KONST. pt. I, ch. 3, art. 19.
182. Id.
183. See notes 183-190, infra.
184. KONST. pt. I, ch. 2, art. 16. Rational pooling of resources by the Union Republics Is
considered a major motive for their remaining in the Union, THE SOVIET STATE AND LAW, supra
note 12, at 103.
185. KONST. pt. I, ch. 3, art. 25.
186. Id. pt. II, ch. 7, art. 64.
187. Id. pt. II, ch. 6, art. 36. Compare 1936 CONST. ch. X, 6rt, 123.
188. KONST. pt. II, ch. 6, art. 36, para. 2.
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under Part VII, on the judicial system.189 Article 159 differs from its
predecessor in only one respect: judicial proceedings are to be either in
the language of the Union or Autonomous Republic, Autonomous Region
or Area, as previously provided, or in the language spoken by the majority
of the population in the locality.' 90 The result seems to be that the
principal courts of the Republics with a predominantly Russian or
Russian-speaking urban population - that is, all major Soviet courts -
may abandon the language of the Republic.
3. Historical and Theoretical Origins
The principles of self-determination, socialist federalism and volun-
tary union have a long and complex history and are bound up with the
formation of the USSR itself Although Lenin devoted considerable atten-
tion to the "national question" in relation to the structure of the Soviet
state, 191 it was largely Stalin's more centralist conception that deter-
mined the state structure as embodied in the 1924 and 1936 constitu-
189. Id. pt. VII, ch. 20, art. 159.
190. Id. Compare 1936 CoNsr. ch. IX, art. 110. Shchetinin refers to the growing role of the
Russian language, B. V. SHCHETININ, supra note 24, at 10. Thus the"Soviet nation." formed through
the merger of peoples, will be linguistically Russian, Meissner'supra note 27, at 136.
191. For Lenin's nationality policy, see his Critical Remarks on the National Question in V. I.
LENIN, 20 COLC'ED WORKS 17(1964), and The Right of Nations to Self-Determination, Id. at 393.
See also id. at 71, 109, 222, 290; V. I. LENIN, 25 COLLEcTED WORKs 91, 99 (1964); V. I. Lm..I., O
PoLmTCs AND REVOLUtIoN 315-19 (1968). For a selection of Lenin's writings on the national
question in Russian, see generally V. I. LENIN, VoPRosY NATSiO.AL'Noi POLMrI I PRO-
LET raSKoGo LNENATSIONALIZMA (1965). For a summary and analysis, see IL PiPEs, supra note
38, at 41-49, 110-12,269-93. For references to Lenin's writings on the national question, see the index
in V. I. LENIN, 31 SOCHINEmuA at 268-71 (3d ed. 1930-1933). It should be noted that Lenin's policy.
while in part tactical, was not inconsistent. The rights to self-determination and secession were
intended to establish national equality, but not to be exercised. Moreover, most nationalisms were
considered bourgeois and therefbre to be opposed. For an account of Lenin's peculiar dialectical
reasoning on this question, see A. ULAt, TRE BOLSHEVn,. 453-55 (1965). Professor Ulam em-
phasizes the lasting effects of Lenin's "tortuous" logic and "paradoxical" personality on both Party and
state, id. at 455, vii. With regard to the form of the multinational socialist state, Lenin rejected the
national-cultural autonomy" of the Austrian socialists Renner and Bauer, as well as the"autonomiza-
tion" concept of Stalin, in favor of a federal structure based on the national-territorial principle. The
1918 RSFSR Constitution adopted a principle of "national-territorial autonomy." while Lenin's
views changed more than once between 1913 and 1923, it appears (especially from his 1922
memorandum on the national question) that he favored less centralization than was advocated by
Stalin, approved by the XIIth Party Congress, and written into the 1924 USSR Constitution during
Lenin's incapacity. See R. PI'Es, supra note 38, at 269-93. The English translation of Lenin's 1922
memorandum is found id. at 282-87. The Russian text was first published in the Soviet Union in
Ko.rmsisT, No. 9, 1956, and is fbund in V. I. LENIN, 45 SoCHINENA 356-62 (Sth ed.), as well as in
V.I. LENIN, VoPnosY NATsIONAL'NOI POLrIIKI I PRoLETArtSKOGO INTErNATSIONAuIZMA 164
(1965). See also Lepeshkin, Mnogoobrazie vidoosovetskoifederatsil, PRAVOVEDE.iE, No. 5,1975, at
17; Sucheeld, Geneza i rozw6 j wielonarodowego padstwa radzieckiego (1922-1972) PANSTWO I
PaAwo, Nov. 1972, at 3-12.
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tions.' 9 2 The divergence between Leninist principles and a Stalinist
constitutional order created a certain tension, despite the proclamation in
the Stalin constitution of a voluntary union of equal republics in a federal
state.19
3
Khrushchev's program of de-Stalinization, in part a return to
Leninist conceptions, involved exposure of his predecessor's centralist
and indeed genocidal practices.194 A series of acts extending the formal
rights of the Union Republics resulted in several constitutional amend-
ments. 195
P. S. Romashkin provided an early ideological explanation of the new
policy in his July, 1960 report. 196 The Party and state, he said, had
returned to Lenin's policy of extending the Republics' sovereign
rights. 197 The revised constitution should emphasize this. At the same
time, he urged that the people be educated in the spirit of socialist
internationalism and Soviet patriotism, to foster the drawing-together 19 8
of nations. 199 For Lenin had written that the inevitable merger200 of
nations would only arrive after.the full liberation of oppressed nations,
that is, their right to free secession.2 0 1 The full development of each was
the condition of the full amalgamation of all.
192. See R. PIPES, supra note 38, passim.
193. 1936 CONST. eh. II, art. 13.
194. Meissner, supra note 27, at 130. See Suchecki, supra note 191, at 13, See generally V. M.
CHKHIKVADZE, THE STATE, DEMOCRACY AND LEGALITY IN THE USSR 170-72 (1972); DENIsOV &
KIRICHENKO, supra note 23, at 99-101; GCRiORYAN & DOLCOPOLOV, supra note 17, at 42-43:
Meissner, supra note 27, at 130-31.
195. Two important extensions of republican rights had, however, been enacted February 1,
1944. One, allowing the Union Republics diplomatic relations with foreign states, became art, 18 (a)
ofthe Constitution; the other, allowing for republican military formations, became art. 18 (b). Among
Khrushchev's most important legislation were the May 31, 1956 liquidation ofthe Union Ministry of
Justice (transferringits functions to the Union Republics); the statutes of Feb. 11, 1957, extending the
Republics' powers in judicial and administrative-territorial matteis and rehabilitating five
nationalities punished by Stalin; the statute of May 10, 1957, making presidents of republican
Councils of Ministers members of the Union Council of Ministers; an August 29, 1957 decree
transferring the administration of various economic and cultural matters from the Union to the
republican Councils of Ministers; a June 22, 1959 decree of the Council of Ministers on the
competence of the Union and of the Republics in economic affairs; the statute of January 13, 1960,
liquidating the Union Ministry of Internal Affairs (transferring its functions to tile republican
Ministries); and the statute of December 13, 1962, granting planning powers to the Union Republics,
The March 1963 reforms, however, narrowed the Republics' powers. See sources cited In note 55,
supra.
196. Romashkin, supra note 64, at 86-87.
197. Id.
198. Sblizhenie.
199. Romashkin, supra note 68, at 86-87.
200. Sliianie.
201. Romashkin, supra note 68, at 86-87; V. I. LENIN, VOPROSY NATS1ONAL'NOI POLITIKI I
PROLETARSKOGO INTERNATSIONALIZMA 113 (1965). Lenin wrote this in his 1916 thesis On Socialist
[Vol, I
At the XXIInd Party Congress in October, 1961, First Secretary
Khrushchev developed this doctrine into the theory of the "blossom-
ing ' 20 2 of sovereign nations simultaneously with their gradual drawing-
together into a homogeneous society. 203 This doctrine was incorporated
into the new Party Program. 20 4 Such a novel dialectical answer to the
national problem- realizing the Soviet nations' rights through a program
of development, yet only for the purpose of their ultimate merger-must
have been attractive to both centralizers and de-centralizers. Yet as one
American commentator noted, the Soviet peoples in reality had fewer
rights than in the first years after the Revolution, and the over-all con-
tinuity of Soviet nationality policy had not been broken. 20 5
The old question of national sovereignty, revived in Khrushchev's
doctrine, was answered by one Soviet scholar in classic Marxist-Leninist
fashion: republican sovereignty existed in an "organic unity" with that of
the Union, having been expanded rather than sacrificed upon entry into
the USSR. 20 6 The Republics' broadened rights would in fact facilitate
their convergence with each other.20 7
The question remained, however, of how to delimit union and
republican competences in legislation. Another scholar gave a more
straightforward answer: the methods of delimiting competences should
be alterable whenever "the Party thinks a given set of social cir-
cumstances at a given moment is more or less important. " 20 8
Meanwhile, Khrushchev had been deposed and another Party con-
gress held.2 0 9 While the "de-centralizing" trend in legislation continued
for a few years, 210 the end of de-Stalinization soon became apparent in a
Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination. See V. I. LENIN, 29 COLLECTED NvORS
325, cited in V. M. CHKHIKVADZE, supra note 194, at 163.
202. Rastsvet.
203. Meissner, supra note 27, at 136. On the dialectical relationship between national develop-
ment and convergence, which lead to the synthesis ofthe "new historical community ofpeople,-see
B. V. SHCHErXINI, supra note 24, at 10-11, and especially 31.
204. Meissner, supra note 27, at 136.
205. Pipes, Nationality Policy Since Stalin, PROBLEMS OF THE PEOPLES OF MTE USSR. June
1963, at 9-13.
206. Manelis, The Unity of Sovereignty of the USSR and of Sovereignty of the Union Republics
during the Period of the Full-Scale Construction of Communisn, quoted In TUjE SovIET LEGAL
SYSTEM, supra note 66, at 34-35 (trans. from SOVErSKOE COSUDARSTVO I PRnvO, July 1964, at 17).
207. Id.
208. Kirichenko, The Problem of Delimiting Constitutional Law ofthe Union and of the Republics,
quoted in THE SoviEr LEGAL SysTE , supra note 66, at 34 (trans. from. SOVETSKOE COSUDAWrvo
I PaAvo, Nov. 1967, at 53).
209. Khrushchev was ousted in October, 1964. The XXIII Party Congress was held in March-
April, 1966. See Meissner, supra note 27, at 116.
210. By a joint act of October 4, 1965 the Party Central Committee and the USSR Council or
Ministers transferred some competence in economic and cultural matters to the republican Councils
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new centralism, 21' in a renewal of Stalin's concept of the nation and in a
revitalized policy of russification. 212 At the XXIVth Party Congress Gen-
eral Secretary Brezhnev advanced the thesis of the "Soviet people" as a
higher manifestation of the human community than the nation. 213
Scholars, however, could not agree on the chronology of the process
of "blossoming, "convergence" and "merger. 21 4 'Their differences led
them to theoretical positions varying from the demand' that republican
rights be further extended, to the assumption that the federal state
structure must wither away.215 V. M. Chkhikvadze, Director of the
Academy of Sciences' Institute of State and Law, represented what was
perhaps the ideological median.2 16 Blossoming and'integration, he as-
serted, would continue throughout the period of the building of com-
munism, as a process that must not be artificially accelerated. 211 Only
with the full development of communism "on a world scale" would there
occur a total legal and political amalgamation of nations.218 Like
Khrushchev's original formula, this scheme assured the centralists that
total merger was the goal, yet postponed this so indeterminately far into
the future as to afford the autonomists some comfort.
With the drafting of a new constitution, Soviet scholars and officials
were squarely faced with the question of what nationality policy it was to
reflect. At the 1969 meeting of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute
for Soviet Legislation, convened to coordinate the necessary research
ofMinisters. V. M. CHKHIKVADZE, supra note 194, at 172. By a constitutional amendment ofAugust
3, 1966 the number of a Union Republic's representatives in the Soviet ofNationalities of the USSR
Supreme Soviet was raised from 25 to 32. Rusinova & Rianzhin, supra note 24, at 83.
211. On August 3, 1966 a central Ministry of Education was created; on November 25, 1968 the
central Ministry for the Protection of Public Order (created July 26, 1966) was transformed Into a
renewed Ministry of Internal Affairs; on August 31, 1970 the central Ministry of Justice was
re-established. Meissner, supra note 27, at 135. These were "union-republican" ministries, L.e,,
functioning through the corresponding ministries of the Republics. Id.
212. Id. at 136, 138. During the USSR 50th anniversary celebrations in 1972, Mr. Brczhnev also
renewed the Stalinist dogma of the leading role of the Russian people. Id. at 130, 137. Writing In
1974, B. V. Shchetinin asserted that a great role in the formation of the new Soviet people had been
played by all nations and nationalities of the USSR, .and above all the great Russian people," B, V.
SHCHET1NIN, supra'note 24, at 32. Russification is a traditional policy of the impositipn of the Russian
language and culture upon colonized peoples. When implemented in the Russian-dominated USSR,
"internationalism" as a policy of the elimination of national differences Is, in effect, a means of
russification. See I. DZIUBA, INTERNATIONALISM OR RUSSIFICATiON? (1968). Mr. Dziuba, a Soviet
literary critic, has since been persuaded to change his views.
213. Meissner, supra note 27, at 136. Glorification of the "supra-national" Soviet people thus
coincides with the glorification of the Russian language, culture and people. See note 190, supra.
214. See notes 215-18 and accompanying text, infra.
215. Meissner, supra note 27, at 137-38.





preparatory to drafting, M. G. Kirichenko referred to drafts of new laws
widening the Republics' legislative competence as "constitutional
acts."2 19 He intended them to affect the constitution itself.2 2 0 He also
suggested that the federal structure of the multi-national state be em-
phasized and that the sovereignties of Union and Republic be clearly
defined. 22 1 V. E. Guliev advocated an unambiguous constitutional decla-
ration of the right of nations to self-determination.2 2
2
In his speech on the fiftieth anniversary of the USSR, General
Secretary Brezhnev emphasized a different aspect of Soviet policy.
"
Declaring the national problem solved, he proclaimed the birth ofa "new
historical entity," the Soviet people, educated in the spirit of "inter-
nationalism" and "Soviet patriotism." 224 He repeatedly referred to the
drawing-together of nations, and linked this process to the integration of
the economy. 225 Indeed, the following year a system of "economic re-
gions" was instituted, transcending republican borders so as to promote
national along with economic integration. 226 But as Party Secretary K. F.
Katushev asserted, the doctrines of economic integration, national con-
vergence, and the "new historical entity" of the Soviet people must not be
regarded as infringements on union-republican national sovereignty.
22 7
Nevertheless, in the long run the Soviet nations are considered tempor-




In his May 24, 1977, report on the draft of the new constitution,
General Secretary Brezhnev declared that the Federal structure was
219. Meissner, supra note 27, at 198-99.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 199.
222. Id. at 200.
223. L. I. BREZHNEv, ON THE POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND TIlE LNTERNATIONAL
SrruATION 185 (1973).
224. Id. at 197, 205, 212.
225. Id. at 206-13.
226. Breslauer, supra note 9, at 20.
227. Katushev, Strengthening the Unity of the Socialist Countries is a Law of the Development of
World Socialism, KO..muNiST No. 16, 1973, trans. and reprinted in SovIET LAW AND GOMMB-
mENT, Winter 1974-1975, at 5, 9, 18; Guliev & Shchiglik, supra note 113. at 15.
228. Groshev, book review in Vopfosy IsTolUl KPSS, No. 6. 1974 (reviewing L P. TSAMERuon.
THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET
MuLTINATIONAL STATE), trans. and reprinted in SovLEr LAW.AND GovemNiENT, Spring 1975, at
100-106. Before 1961, Tsamerian had expressed the idea that "blossoming" was to precede "con-
vergence," but later accepted the simultaneity of the two processes. Meissner, supra note 27, at 137
n.195. The reviewer now attacks his contention that the Soviet nations will survive up to the
appearance of mature communism on a world and not just a national scale. Tsamerian, he declares,
"even debates" authors who say that Lenin emphasized the transitional character of the Soviet
federation on the path to complete unity of nations. Id. at 105. He chides scholars who limit
themselves to opposing national oppression and supporting self-determination and who thus
misinterpret Lenin's nationality policy. Groshev, supra at 101.
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sound and needed no changes. 229 Likewise, the Republics' sovereign
rights should remain.2 30 Referring to the need for simultaneous de-
velopment and drawing-together of the Republics, he stressed that this
process required a "genuinely democratic" combination of union and
republican interests.2 31 Evidently, the detailed working-out of this doc-
trine would be left largely to future policy decisions.
On balance, it appears that the main concessions to non-Russian and
union-republican interests in the new constitution are in the nature of
formal "bourgeois right," intended to vanish along with all vestiges of the
bourgeois state when socialism is transcended. The re-distribution of real
power, however, tends to favor the center. Furthermore, the long-term
programmatic mandates aim for the withering-away of nations as well as of
their state forms. The integration of the economic basis is evidently
expected to effect the integration of the nationally differentiated
superstructure. Finally, the Party supremacy discussed above promises
to replace the federal state structure with a highly centralized mechanism
primarily organized along functional rather than national lines. 2 2 The
practical result would be the fusion of all nations into the dominant
Russian mold.
C. FOREIGN POLICY
For the first time a separate chapter of the USSR Constitution is
devoted to foreign policy.233 The emergence of the Soviet Union as a
world power with a system of socialist allies 23 4 and two major adversaries
has received constitutional recognition. A definition of the USSR's inter-
national position, and a statement of its policies toward allies and com-
229. L. I. BREZHNEV, supra note 8, at 20-21.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. L. SCHAPIMO, THE GOVERNMEsNT AND POLITICS OF THE SOVIET UNION 63 (1967).
233. KONST. pt. I, ch. 4. For abriefhistorical account ofSoviet foreign policy, see G. VON 11AUG11,
A HISTORY OF SOVIET RussIA 145-54, 191-215, 261-306, 396-417, 450-72 (6th -ed. 1972). See also
Aspaturian, Soviet Foreign Policy, in FOREIGN POLICY IN WORLD POLrrIcs 174 (4th ed. R. Macridis
1972). For an ample history and analysis of Soviet foreign policy to 1973, see A, ULAM, EXPANSION
AND COEXISTENCE (2d ed. 1974). For a summary offoreign policy decisions of the XXV Congress, see
Ushakov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo v bor'be za osushchestvlenie vneshno politicheskol programiny XXV
s'ezda KPSS, SOvETSKOE COSUDARSTVO I PRAvo, April 1977, at 131. For major documents of the
Congress, see MATERIALY XXV S'EZDA KPSS (1976). For a summary of its western policy, see
Marantz, Foreign Policy: The Soviet Union and the Noncommunist World, in TIE TWv.NTIY-FIFTII
CONGRESS OF THE CPSU, supra note 9, at 89-94.
234. As Romashkin pointed out in his 1960 report, socialism had "broken out of one country" and
become a world system. Romashkin, supra note 68, at 81-82.
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petitors, 23 5 have been deemed appropriate in both the Preamble and
body of the new constitution. 236
The Preamble sets out the historical background and defines the
role, policy and specific tasks of the USSR in world affairs. 237 Portraying
the Bolshevik revolution as the beginning of "mankind's world-historic
turn from capitalism to socialism, " 238 it suggests a universal, continuous
and inevitable process centered on the development of the Soviet state.
The Preamble declares that the Soviet victory in World War H, which
strengthened the international position and prestige of the USSR, 239
furthered its goals of socialism, national liberation, democracy, and world
peace.
Each of the succeeding sections of the Preamble makes a reference to
foreign policy.2 40 The section that defines present-day Soviet society
refers to the working people as "patriots and internationalists. " 241 Im-
plicit in this phrase is the presumed identity of Soviet and world socialist
interests. It is this assumption that allows the USSR to maintain a re-
volutionary posture while pursuing traditional political goals.
In the programmatic section, the list of the state's principal tasks
includes national security, peace, and international cooperation - osten-
sibly a defensive program.2 42 The last sentence defines the present
international position of the USSR as "part of the world socialist system,"
and refers to the Soviet people's "international responsibility. ' 243 Here
again, the tone is conservative. 24
The chapter on foreign policy consists of three articles. 245 Article 28
presents the basic formula of peace, security and international coopera-
tion.246 The elements of the policy of peace and security include peacefil
235. Romashkin wrote that the revised constitution should reflect the policy ofcooperation among
the socialist countries, as well as that of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.
Romashkin, supra note 68, at 82.
236. KONST. Preamble; pt. I, ch. 4, arts. 28, 29, 30.
237. KONST. Preamble.
238. Id.






244. Compare 1924 CO NST. Preamble, especially paras. 1 and 2, and the last clause; 1918
CONST. art. 1, ch. 2(3Xd) and art. 1, ch. 3(6). Robert Sharlet characterizes the new constitution as a
"moderate, middle-of-the-road document." Sharlet, supra note 6, at 3.
245. KONST. pt. I, ch. 4, arts. 28, 29, 30. The word polilika is used to mean both "policy" and
"politics."
246. Id. art. 28. These phrases are apparently taken from the United Nations Charter; U.N.
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coexistence, 247 general and complete disarmament, 248 and the preven-
tion of wars of aggression. It is notable that the list ofiforeign-policy goals
in the second paragraph of this article begins with the ensuring of favor-
able conditions for the building of communism in the USSR and the
protection of Soviet state interests. 24 9 This neo-Stalinist emphasis on
Soviet development rather than international revolution could well be
called "communism in one country."
250
Only after these primary goals come the references to the interna-
tional communist movement. 251 "Strengthening the positions of world
socialism" sums up the aims of present East Bloc policy.2 52 Support of
national-liberation struggles refers to the revived internationalism of
Khrushchev's neo-Leninist Third World policy. 253 Disarmamient and
peaceful co-existence are keynotes of post-Stalin policy towards the
capitalist West. 254 Finally, the prohibition of war propaganda, set out in a
separate paragraph, re-affirms the basic policy of peace. 255
Article 29 sets out eleven principles guiding USSR relations with
other states. 256 Most of them are universally recognized. Notable, how-
ever, is the echo of Helsinki 257 in the principles of the inviolability of
borders and the territorial integrity of states, referring to international
CHaRTER Preamble art. 1, para. 1 and art. 1, para. 3. They may symbolize the Incorporation of
international law into the law of the Soviet state. See notes 257, 259, infra.
247. With Khrushchev's de-Stalinization of 1956 the theory of capitalist encirclement was aban-
doned and replaced by a renewed doctrine of "peaceful co-existence" among countries with different
social systems. Kotok & Farberov, supra note 29, at 12; Romashkin, supra note 64, at 82,
248. Added in the final text.
249. KONST. pt. I, ch. 4, art. 28, para. 2. The latter phrase was added In the final text.
250. In April, 1925 Stalin advanced a new doctrine of"socialism in one country." G. VoN RAuCt,
supra note 233, at 168. It held that it was possible and indeed necessary to achieve socialism In a
strong, secure state before spreading the revolution worldwide. Clearly contrary to Lenin's Inter-
nationalism, it was accompanied by the theory of"capitalist encirclement" necessitating military and
industrial fortification.
251. See notes 252-53 and accompanying text, infra.
252. See notes 257-260, infra. See BREZHNEV, supra note 223, at 84, 104, 108, 113. It is held that
there is no contradiction between the doctrines of supporting national liberation and of peace, since
the conditions for national liberation arise of their own accord, without military interference, See,
e.g., the recent article by Kunaev, Politburo member and First Secretary of the Kazakh Party
organization, V bor'be za ukreplenie mira i druzhby mezhdu narodami, KO UIUNIST, July 1977, at 31,
253. Lenin urged that the Bolsheviks agitate among the underdeveloped and colonized peoples,
cooperating temporarily with bourgeois national-liberation forces. See, e.g., Lenin, Preliminary
Draft of Theses on the National and Colonial Questions, in ON PoLrrICS AND REVOLUTIoN 315-19(3,
Cominor ed. 1968) (especially Points 9 and 11). See also 1918 CONST., art. I, ch. 3, sec, 5.
254. See note 235, supra.
255. KONST. pt. I, ch. 4, art. 28, para. 3.
256. KONST. pt. I, ch. 4, art. 29.
257. Final Act, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, 73 THlE DIII"T Or
STATE BULL. 323, 324, 325. The Final Act was signed August 1, 1975. On the "echo" of Helsinki,
see note 3, supra.
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recognition of the European status quo. 2 58 The mention of non-
interference in internal affairs and respect for human rights and basic
freedoms also presages Belgrade. 259
Article 30 deals specifically with the "world socialist system" or
"socialist community," of which the USSR is called merely a component
part.2 60 Friendship, cooperation and comradely mutual assistance are as
traditional in this context as "socialist internationalism." 26 1 The meaning
of these principles, however, doubtless includes the gloss of the 1968
"Brezhnev doctrine." 262 Economic integration and the "international
socialist division of labor" are evidently to provide the material basis for a
more unified pro-Soviet bloc, and may even constitute the first stage of
national convergence and merger on the Soviet federal model. 26 3
258. In his report to the XXIV Party Congress in 1971. General Secretary Brezhnev had called for
a European conference on peace and security and for the recognition of post-war borders. L I.
BEZHNEV, supra note 223, at 108, 113.
259. These conflicting principles figured prominently in the follow-up conference in Belgrade. On
the summary document of March 8, 1978, mentioning non-interference but omitting human rights,
see N. Y. Times, March 9, 1978, at 7, col. 1.
260. KONST. pt. I, ch. 4, art. 30. On the European "socialist community,"see Z. BnINSKI, TILE
SovIET BLOC (1967); THE NEW COiNouNIST MANIFMO (D. Jacobs ed. 1961); Aspaturian, The
Soviet Union and International Communism, in FOREICN POLICY L' WORLD POLmCs 238 (R.
Macridis ed. 1972).
261. In the final text, the latter received a dignifying epithet as "the principle of" socialist
internationalism. KONST. pt. I, ch. 4, art. 30. For a definition, see 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOvIEr LIV
618-619 (F. Feldbrugge ed. 1973).
262. In the 1950's de-Stalinization released the forces of polycentrism in Eastern Europe.
Khrnshchev's successors sought to reverse the trend. Immediately after the 1968 occupation of
Czechoslovakia, they produced the' the"Brezhnev doctrine." It justified intervention by holding that
a threat to socialism in any one country was a threat to all socialist countries. In his report to the XXIV
Party Congress in 1971, Mr. Brezhnev referred to the "extraordinary conditions" caused in Czecho-
slovakia by the anti-socialist forces of imperialism and counter-revolution, which had necessitated
"internationalist assistance" by the Soviet Union. In a conciliatory vein, he explained that the world
socialist system was "still a young organism," bearing the marks ofearlier epochs. To determine the
proper line to follow, each country had to find the correct combination ofthe general and nationally
specific in social development. BREzHNEv, supra note 223, at 90-92. The Czechs had evidently
over-stressed the nationally specific.
263. At an October 1973 conference on The Development and International Cooperation of
Socialist Nations held in Moscow, Party Secretary K. F. Katushev, presentingSoviet experience as a
guidefrthe socialistworld, spoke ofthe "development" and"convergence" ofthe nations ofEastern
Europe. He asserted that the internal national interests ofthe socialist states had come to coincide "to
quite a great degree" with their common international needs. Thus, on the basis of economic
integration through CMEA, Soviet nationality policy could be applied without as well as within the
USSR. Katushev, Strengthening the Unity of the Socialist Countries is a Law of the Development of
World Socialism, KoMuNIs'r No. 16,1973, reprintedin 13 SoviE'r LAvAD CovEn.'tr., Winter
1974-75, at 3-18. The goal was evidently a merger ofnations and states on the Soviet model, in effect,
an extension of the Soviet system. Mr. Katushev, who supervised relations with other ruling
Communist Parties, is said to have played a role in the Czech intervention of1968. The same Party
plenum which approved the draft constitution and released N. V. Podgorny from the Politburo saw
Mr. Katushev's transfer from the Party Central Committee, where he was replaced by K. V. Rusak-ov,
to the Council on Mutual Economic Aid. Ko~snwwis', May 1977, at 5; Sharlet, supra note 6. at 1.
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Chapter 5, also new, indirectly concerns foreign policy.264 Entitled
"Defense of the Socialist Fatherland,"2 6 5 it consists of two articles, the
first of which refers to "defending the gains of social ism." 2 0 Both specify
the Armed Forces. They supplement the Articles in Chapter 7 on the
citizens' duties of defense and military service.20 7 Also among the citi-
zens' duties listed in Chapter 7 is the "internationalist duty" to further
friendship and cooperation with peoples of other countries as well as the
"maintenance and consolidation of world peace." 2" 8
The specific addition to USSR jurisdiction of Soviet relations with
international organizations has been mentioned above. 2 D Additionally,
the Council of Ministers is now empowered to take measures to ensure
state security.2 70 Matters within the scope of its "general guidance" in
foreign relations are also enumerated. 271
Finally, the creation of the new vice-presidential post in the Pres-
idium facilitates the Party General Secretary's assumption of the state
presidency.,272 As newly-elected President Brezhnev said in his June 16,
1977 speech, this gives logical form to his representation of the USSR in
foreign affairs.273 It is a rationalizing measure, confirming Party leader-
ship in this area.
On the whole, the foreign-policy articles of the new document reflect
old policies. Romashkin's proposals have been adopted, Khrushchev's
theses incorporated. The USSR's place in history and in the contempo-
rary world is defined, its legitimacy reaffirmed. True, its long-term
historibal role remains dynamic. Yet even the revived militarism em-
phasizes defense. Ostensibly, the present concern is to protect and
reinforce what has already been won. 4
264. KONST. pt. I, ch. 5.
265. The Soviet translation reads "Motherland," though etymologicallyotechestvo Is equivalent to
"Fatherland."
266. KONST. pt. I, ch. 5, arts. 31-32.
267. KONST. pt. II, ch. 7, arts. 62-63. Compare 1936 CONST. ch. X, arts. 133, 132.
268. KONST. pt. III, ch. 7, art. 69. This is perhaps another manifestation ofthe educative role of
the state in preparing the masses for communist self-administration. If so, it is evidently assumed that
nations will survive into the communist era.
269. Id. pt. III, eh. 8, art. 73 (10). Compare 1936 CONST. ch. II, art. 14. See supra note 149.
270. KONST. pt. V, ch. 16, art. 131 (4).
271. Id. art. 131 (6). Compare 1936 CONST. ch. V, art. 68 (4).
272. KONST. pt. V, ch. 15, art. 120. Compare 1936 CONrST. ch. II1, art. 48. The new post of First
Vice-President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was filled by V. v. Kuznetsov. Pravda, Oct. 8,
1977, at 1, col. 3.
273. Ko MmUNISr, June 1977, at 7.
274. For an account of the 60th anniversary celebrations of the Bolshevik revolution and an
appraisal of the USSR's foreign policy, see N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1977, at 3, col. 1. Ambassador Toon Is
IV. CENTRIFUGAL FORCES
As a register of the historical moment, the 1977 USSR Constitution
presents the Soviet leaders' official interpretation of domestic and global
developments. While their ideological posture precludes recognition of
certain centrifugal trends,2 75 the programmatic aspects of the document
seem intended to counter-act them. These centrifugal tendencies are
manifested on a social, national and international level.
On a social level, the development ofspecialized professional groups
causes inter-elite rivalry. 276 The Party is forced to compete with manager-
ial, military, scientific and other "interest groups" while trying to bind
them into a homogeneous whole. 277 Party control becomes increasingly
difficult as technology exceeds the skills and comprehension of Party
overseers. 278 At the same time, the growth of a privileged bureaucracy
threatens to obstruct central control.2 79 The common symptoms of post-
industrial social malaise tend to undermine Soviet ideals of civic be-
havior. Social alienation, considered a malady of capitalist society, seems
to underlie the problems of alcoholism, theft280 and juvenile delin-
quency 28' in the USSR. Finally, the persistence of religious practices and
national traditions, officially considered relics of earlier historical epochs,
challenges the development of a de-spiritualized and ethnically undiffer-
entiated Soviet culture. 282 In these ways society increasingly diverges
from the model of social uniformity under centralized Party control.
quoted as characterizing the Soviet Union as "more conservative" than before. Id. In his speech
during the celebrations Defense Minister D. F. Ustinov promised arms control and international
detente. Id. at 3, cols. 2-3. Indeed, the anniversary parade included no ICBMs. Id. at 3, col. 3. But
T-54 tanks later showed up in Ethiopia. The Sunday Times (London), Jan. 22. 1978, at 10, ol. 1.
275. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
276. See H. SKILLDNG & F. GsuFrrs, supra note 13.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See Breslauer, supra note 9, at 19.
280. It is revealing that Article 61 includes a new civic obligation to combat the theft of state
property. KoNsT. pt. II, ch. 7, art. 61.
281. Soviet legal periodicals of the past decade are replete with discussions ofcriminal and lesser
offenses among minors. On juvenile crime in the USSR, see N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1978. at 1, col. 3;
Mar. 6, 1978, at 1, col. 3.
Soviet paternalism is not limited to minors, however. Professor Berman finds thatSovietjurists are
developing a new, "parental" type of law to educate the masses for the age of communist self-
administration when both state and law will have withered away. BEIMAN, supra note 2, ch. 10. The
new constitution mentions "rearing the man of communist society" as a principal state task, Ko.%sr.
Preamble; and, in the language added in the final text, expresses the states concern for "the moral
...upbringing of Soviet people", KONST. pt I, ch. 3, art. 27.
282. See note 14, supra. For an example of spiritual and cultural challenge'to official values, see
Moroz, A Chronicle of Resistance in Ukraine, TkE UKRAINIAN QuAmRERLY, Spring 1971. at 13-37,
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On a national level, centrifugal tendencies develop as the interests of
various peoples diverge from those of the Russian center. Economic
development, expected to produce national assimilation, often serves
merely to reinforce national loyalties with local economic interests. 283 In
this way, traditional nationalism reappears in modem form. 28 4 The com-
bination of a mushrooming indigenous population and heavy industriali-
zation in Soviet Central Asia, for example, threatens traditional Russian
dominance2 8 5 This threat will become more serious when the Russians
become a ruling minority in the USSR.286 Nor can Soviet ideology, with
its simplistic explanations of nationalism, deal adequately with this prob-
lem. 28 7 Thus in his speech on the fiftieth anniversary of the USSR
General Secretary Brezhnev, insisting that the "old" national problem
had been solved, blamed outside influences in combination with surviv-
ing nationalistic tendencies for creating "new" problems. 28 8 Whether
such a doctrinaire approach can solve them is questionable.
The centrifugal national tendencies within the USSR are mirrored in
the East Bloc, 28 9 where the example of Yugoslavia has encouraged a
search for independent roads to socialism. 290 East European non-
conformity in turn finds its reflection in the Western European com-
munist parties. Drifting further from the Soviet orbit as they approach
power in their own countries, the Eurocommunist parties exhibit ten-
dencies similar to the nationalist deviations both within the USSR and
among the East European states.
At the same time the Third World, coyly resisting Soviet over-
tures, 291 seems at least equally prone to the magnetism of China, An
aggressive political and military competitor, China poses a serious
ideological threat to the USSR as well. With its contradictory policy of
supporting national liberation movements abroad while suppressing
especially 22-23, 26, 28-36. Mr. Moroz, a Soviet historian, is currently serving a 14-year sentence for
anti-Soviet activity.
283. See Rakowska-Harmstone, supra note 14.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.; Szporluk, surpa note 14.
287. R. PipEs, supra note 38, at 296 (on early Bolshevik ideology).
288. L. I. BREZHNEV, supra note 223, at 211. Similarly, no less an authority than V. M,
Chkhikvadze recently wrote that dissidents cannot be a product ofSoviet society, but must have been
created abroad, Chkhikvadze, Prava cheloveka i ideologicheskaia bor'ba, SOTSIALISTICIE5 AIA
ZAKONNOST', August 1977, at 19-23.
289. See note 260, supra.
290. See generally Z. BIRZEZINSKI, supra note 12, at 185-209; Ulam, Titoism, in MARXISM IN TilE
MODERN WORLD 136-63 (M. Drachkovitch ed. 1965).
291. E.g., Somalia recently evicted Soviet advisers and deprived the USSR oftwo naval bases on
the Horn of Africa. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1977, at 1, cols. 1, 2.
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nationalities at home, 292 the USSR exposes itself to Chinese ideological
attacks which discredit it before the developing countries.
CONCLUSION
Ideologically, there is little of novelty in the 1977 USSR Constitu-
tion. It closely follows Khrushchev's doctrines announced at the XXIst
and XXIInd Party Congresses, and incorporates significant theses of the
1961 Party Program. It adopts most of P. S. Romashkin's proposals of
1960, and incorporates major de-Stalinizing reforms of the Khrushchev
era.293 Although from 1964 the Constitutional Commission was headed
by Mr. Brezhnev, one could properly call this a "Khrushchev Constitu-
tion." 294
Practically, the thrust of the new constitution is to consolidate Soviet
achievements against the threat of centrifugal forces. A strengthened
Party role is to help arrest the trends of social differentiation and pro-
duce a homogeneous society. Extension of certain formal republican
rights might appease autonomist demands, as a policy of convergence and
merger "solved" the national problem. Applied to the East European
socialist state system, this model procedure would help unify and
strengthen it. The loyalty of both ruling and non-ruling communist and
workers' parties is to be affirmed under the principle of socialist inter-
nationalism. At the same time, a conciliatory posture before the capitalist
states would permit an aggressive Third World policy, avoiding nuclear
confrontation without sacrificing the internationalist mission of com-
munism. 295
Three questions remain. First, it is uncertain whether the Party as a
political elite can long control the various interests that arise in a highly
technological society of increasing complexity. The diminishing impor-
292. Strictly speaking, thereis no contradiction, since the nationalism of developing countries Is
considered progressive, while that of the more developed non-Russian Soviet nations is considered
bourgeois and reactionary.
293. Indeed, the document contains few points which are not to be found in the code law, statutes,
or scholarly commentary. Sharlet, supra note 6, at 4-5. Robert Sharlet describes the 1977 draft as"a
generally pragmatic statement of already existing practice and principle." ld. at 3. For Romashkin's
1960 proposals, see note 68, supra.
294. To call it a "Brezhnev Constitution" would be inaccurate. Sharlet, supra note 6, at 4 (on
slightly different grounds).
295. The Soviet Union has avoided direct participation in hostilities wherever the desired results
could be achieved in other ways, e.g., armaments, technical advisers and foreign troops. In Ethiopia,
however, such means have proved inadequate. The SundayTimes (London), Jan. 22,1978, at 10. coi.
1; N. Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1978, at 1, col. 3.
No. 2] U.S.S.R. CONSTITUTION
360 HASTINGS INTL AND COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1
tance of ideology tends to undermine Party influence. Although it sub-
sumes all Soviet elites, the Party itself may become fragmented to the
point at which it becomes a mere vehicle for competing interests.
Second, the dialectic of national development and amalgamation
may prove to be a double-edged weapon. While officially endorsed only
with major qualifications, the doctrine that the Union Republics must
experience complete state development may prove literally true. It is
doubtful that the USSR could survive such a full blossoming of nations.
Yet it is uncertain whether it can avoid it.
Third, deviation in Europe and disloyalty in the Third World, com-
bined with Chinese influence, obstruct new conquests and threaten old
ones. Burdened with a heritage of expansionism and instability, the
Soviet state may no longer be able to appease internal demands with
external successes. Whether a policy of mere consolidation will contain
these forces of disunion remains to be seen.
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